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Family Formation and the Home
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles' & Shelly Kreiczer-Levj
INTRODUCTION'
In this article, we consider the relevance of home sharing in family formation.
When couples or groups of persons are recognized as families, they are afforded
significant benefits and given certain obligations by the law.4 Families have their
own category of laws, rights, and obligations.' Currently, the law of family
formation and recognition is in a state of flux. Although in some respects the
defining legal lines of the family have been well settled for centuries around blood
and the formal legal ties of marriage and parenthood, in significant ways, the family
form has been fundamentally altered over the past few decades. The law of family
formation has finally flexed to include normalization of same-sex couples through
marriage equality.6 And, Assisted Reproductive Technologies ("ART") and gamete
donors have broken the essentiality of the conjugal, genetic link between parents
and children, making reproduction more widely accessible to a greater range of
persons.7 Thus, the traditional "channeling function" of family law-into the
' Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law, Visiting Professor of Law, Bar-Ilan
University Faculty of Law, Affiliated Faculty, Sha'arei Mishpat Academic Center.
2 Associate Professor of Law, College of Law and Business in Ramat Gan. The authors thank
Naomi Cahn, Cynthia Stames, Alicia Brokars Kelly, Courtney Davis, Clare Huntington, Jill Hasday,
Elizabeth MacDowell, Albertina Antognini, and Douglas NeJaime for their helpful feedback on
previous drafts of this article. Thanks also to the organizers and participants of the 2014 Emerging
Family Law Scholars Conference and the 2015 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Midyear
Meeting on Family Law for providing an opportunity to present and receive feedback on this work in its
various stages.
3 This article was written as an equal collaboration between the authors.
4 See in6"a Part I (exploring the implications of family recognition). Recognized families enjoy tax
benefits, social welfare benefits, and acknowledgement with regard to child care and support, health care
and educational support, laws of family dissolution, among other significant benefits and obligations.
See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage": Reconsidering the Duty of Support and
Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 37 & n.136 (2003) (discussing a range of benefits of marriage--
tax benefits, social security benefits and pensions, the ability to file wrongful death actions, health and
bereavement benefits, and intangible benefits such as respect).
s See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004)
(exploring the legal system's treatment of families and family members).
6 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015) (ruling prohibitions on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional). Recent surveys by the Pew Foundation and other polling organizations show
growing public acceptance of same-sex unions. See, e.g., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New
Families, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 18, 2010), http:/www.pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-
marriage-rise-new-families [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH].
' See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money. Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J.
1223, 1255-60 (2013). Adoption is a more traditional means of breaking genetic ties, but it necessitates
specific legislation and judicial oversight in a manner that ART has avoided. See Naomi Cahn & the
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nuclear sexual family including a heterosexual couple and its biologically and
genetically related children-is expanding to include alternate family forms.
8
While this expansion is positive in that it offers more flexibility in recognizing
supportive, intimate family forms, the question is whether the law of family
formation is getting it right as it expands. Is the law recognizing and supporting
families in a manner that is meeting modem normative goals of family law or is it
just expanding out of necessity due to technological changes (ART) or
constitutional necessity (same-sex marriage)? Perhaps, the flexing of the law of
family recognition should be done deliberately and not merely in response to
technological necessity or constitutional demands.
In this article, we make a more deliberate assessment of how the law of family
recognition should expand to include alternative forms, focusing, in particular, on
the impact of the home in centering family life in a manner that goes beyond
sexuality. On the one hand, the home has always been central to the family, but on
the other hand, the home is not consistently used as a sufficient or necessary
condition for family formation.9 Here, we look more closely at the relevance of
home sharing in current law and reimagine how home sharing should influence the
law.' We base our analysis on an assessment of the doctrinal relevance of
cohabitation and the inconsistencies and biases it reveals, including empirical
sociological accounts of the relevance and benefits of home sharing, as well as a
discussion of the dangers and drawbacks of over-reliance on the home in family
formation.
The law of family formation should support and recognize family forms that
improve people's well-being, provide stability, and support reproduction and
vulnerability, allowing people to be more productive in the market and more secure
in their attachments. Such recognition should not tolerate abuse but should
consider citizens' rights to association and the autonomous pursuit of love,
happiness, and a good life. If a family form meets these complex goals, or at least
advances them, a liberal polity can be called upon to consider supporting them.
1'
The current law of family recognition can do more to advance these goals.
Indeed, beyond recognition of ART and same-sex marriage, normative accounts of
new rules for defining the family have been increasingly prevalent. Emphasis on
functional caregiving for defining parent-child relationships has been especially
Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Old Lessons for a New World Applying Adoption Research
and Experience to ART, 24J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 1 (2011).
' See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495,
514-15 (1992).
See infra Part I for a description of the use of the home in family law doctrine.
Cf Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Informal Property Rights of Boomerang Children in the Home,
74 MD. L. REv. 127 (2014) (discussing the potential property rights between members of
intergenerational families).
" See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 293, 304, 313 (2015).
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influential and is becoming increasingly accepted by courts and legislatures.' 2 Other
suggestions, such as recognizing family through economic interdependence 13 and
the relevance of emotional friendships, 4 have remained more theoretical, although
they compellingly challenge our baseline assumptions about family constitution.
The expansion of the law of family recognition does not sufficiently account for
to additional factors that we are argue in this paper require further consideration as
we reimagine how to define family and how to parcel out family law's benefits.
First, the law of family formation over-essentializes sexuality." Such sexuality is
represented both in the horizontal sexual couple and in the vertical parenting
relationship based upon or mimicking sexual reproduction. While important in
creating intimacy, sexuality and sexual reproduction are not the exclusive triggers
for creating intimate family forms. Yet, only sexual couples enjoy the benefits of
family recognition.
Second, cohabitation-with or without sexuality-is an underexplored and
increasingly relevant indicator for complex family forms, creating stability,
protecting vulnerability, and expressing associative desires. Family has always been
centered around the home, and home life has been demonstrated to be central and
significant for an increasing variety of households. Intergenerational families,
elderly parents and older children living with nuclear families, small kin groups
(siblings who co-reside), adult long-term roommates, and non-married couples
increasingly reside together for extended periods of time and engage in economic
sharing and emotional interdependence in ways that support the functions of the
traditional family. 6
Now is a crucially relevant time to consider the importance of these factors in
family formation. As the legalization of same-sex marriage is resulting in
12 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; see also Susan
Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 18-20 (2008); Naomi R. Cahn,
Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 17 (1997); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why
Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple
Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 316-17 (2007); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal
Family Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 123 (2004);
Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47, 74-75 (2007); Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of
Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 421-25 (2013).
13 See generally Janet Halley, After Gender. Tools for Progressives in a Shift from Sexual
Domination to the Economic Family, 31 PACE L. REV. 887 (2011) (discussing the economic
significance of families); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Better Equity for Elders: Basing Couples' Economic
Relations Law on Sharing and Caring, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 387, 388-89 (2012) (discussing
assessment of the degree of economic interdependence in relationships).
14 See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 208-11 (2007).
5 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SExUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 143-44 (1995) (discussing the overemphasis on sexuality
in family law).
"s See infra Part II.A.
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legislatures repealing domestic relations and civil union legislation as unnecessary,' 7
we need to recognize that non-sexual families, kin groups, and intergenerational
families could benefit from such legislation in meaningful ways and that such
families fulfill many of the goals of family law. Moreover, while marriage equality
may make discussion of alternatives to marriage irrelevant for sexual same-sex
couples, the discussion is still relevant for non-sexual sibling and kin groups,
intergenerational families, and unrelated adults who choose to cohabit over long
periods of time and engage in either economic or emotional sharing without
sexuality. These groups, who will never be entitled to, nor wish to "marry," should
take up the fight for these alternative family forms. As to sexual cohabitants who
choose not to marry, it is less apparent why they need these alternate statuses, as
they are not likely to choose to formalize their relations, although they may choose
alternative registration systems for the increased flexibility and the lower imposition
such status may entail. Moreover, in certain limited circumstances that we describe
in this article, obligations or rights can be justifiably imposed on cohabitants, 8 and
then the act of living together, whether sexual or not, may be relevant.
For instance, cohabiting non-sexual siblings have recently increased requests for
legal recognition, 9 though this is currently only granted in Hawaii."0 As long-term
cohabitants who are interdependent economically and emotionally, these
cohabitants look to state recognition to assist with the needs of health care proxies
in aging and social welfare benefits that are otherwise reserved for "nuclear family"
members.2' Another group of non-sexual families who seek these benefits are older
children living with parents and middle-aged adults caring for elderly parents. 2
Sexual cohabitation is also becoming more accepted and increasingly prevalent, 3
creating the support systems of family life. These cohabitants provide each other
with familial support, stability, and protection, yet they cannot access the state
benefits of family life.
17 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.100 (2012) (preserving domestic partnerships only for
those over sixty-two years of age in light of the advent of same-sex marriage in Washington),
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=26.60.100.
'8 See infra Part HIl.
"9 See infra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (1997),
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Voll2_Ch0501-0588/HRS0572C/HRS_0572C-0001.htm.
Reciprocal beneficiaries have access to a limited number of rights and benefits on the state level,
including inheritance rights, id. § 560:2-102, workers compensation, id. § 386-41, health insurance and
pension benefits, id. § 88-339; § 431:10A-601, hospital visitation, id. § 323-2, healthcare decision
making, id., and the right to sue for wrongful death, id. § 663-3. Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary status
also offers reciprocal beneficiaries the option to jointly own property as "tenants by the entirety." Id. §
572C Note. Reciprocal beneficiaries must be two adults who cannot otherwise marry. Id. § 572C-4.
21 See inka notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
22 C£ Debra H. Kroll, To Care or Not to Care: The Ultimate Decision for Adult Caregivers in a
Rapidly Aging Society, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 403, 409 (2012) (discussing the increasing care
responsibilities of adults for aging parents).
23 See PEW RESEARCH, supra note 6.
[Vol. 104
Family Formation and the Home
Non-sexual cohabitation has occasionally been used as a tool in defining the
family, even without the formal ties of marriage and legal parenthood.24 Yet, the
extent and nature of how home sharing creates family rights and obligations is
riddled with inconsistencies and conflicting determinations.2" On the one hand, it
has been argued that domesticity has in some contexts had too great an impact on
family law by ignoring relationships that occur outside the home,26 but in other
contexts, joint living has provided no familial legal rights or obligations at all.
27
Usually cohabitation takes on legal meaning when it most mirrors the nuclear,
sexual family,2s but other laws take a more expansive perspective on family
constitution.29 Indeed, we demonstrate deep doctrinal inconsistencies between rent
control ordinances, public housing laws, and food stamp programs, which take on a
broader definition of family to include the household where sexuality is not crucial,
and private family law, which decidedly does not.3" Such a divergence in the
doctrine of family formation has developed without sufficient consideration of the
justification of excluding households from private family law benefits while
simultaneous recognizing them as family for administrative and zoning purposes.
Although the term "cohabitation" is often understood to connote sexuality, in
this article, we want to break apart the connection of cohabitation and sexuality.
31
Moreover, the cohabitation or domestic joint living we are referring to includes
intentional joint living for an extended or semi-permanent time frame. Not all
house sharing would meet the minimum standard we lay out for legal
domesticity/cohabitation both in terms of time frame and the extent of joint
living.32 Borrowing from social science research, we argue that domesticity has its
own emotional, familial significance that deserves legal recognition in a manner
that is not essentially intertwined with sexuality and is more reflective of the way
relationships are formed and are important to cohabitants. On the other hand, we
recognize the dangers of attributing too much significance to the home divorced
from other considerations and concerns. Therefore, this article first weighs the
24 See infra Part I.
25 See infra Part I.
26 See, e.g., Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 191, 197-98 (summarizing different scholars views of the
ways in which the non-traditional family is harmed by the state).
2 5See infra Part I.
2 See, e.g., Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 83 (Va. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967)
(explaining that cohabiting as man and wife in Virginia where mixed race marriages were not permitted
was taken as evidence of an illegal marriage).
29 See infra Part I.
30 See infra Part I.
31 Cf Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 200 (discussing the different forms of domestic relationships
separate from those relating to marriage and conjugality and the legal preference afforded to more
traditional conjugal relationships). Indeed, "cohabitation" is regularly assumed to include sexual
relationships. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Who Pays for the "Boomerang Generation"?: A Legal
Perpective on Financial Support for Young Adults, 37 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 45, 52, 54 (2014);
Lynne Marie Kohm, Roe's Effects on Family Law, 71 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1339, 1368-69 (2014).
32 See inrfra Part I.A.
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nature, benefits, and drawbacks of legal recognition of cohabitation and then
attempts to provide the beginning of a legal framework that accounts for both the
benefits and the concerns in a nuanced manner.
This inquiry therefore includes both a descriptive account of the ways the home
has been both relevant and irrelevant to family formation and provides a series of
prescriptive suggestions for making the home part of the inquiry of legal family
formation. We are not arguing that the home should be the exclusive or even
dominant factor in family recognition. We are, however, arguing that the home
should be part of the discussion of family formation, that it should be considered in
a manner not essentially tied to sexuality, and that it should be used consistently
across legal doctrines. Moreover, while marriage as the fundamental basis for family
formation has been awarded a comprehensive list of benefits and obligations, in our
discussion of the home, we suggest that cohabitation need not mirror marriage and
can be used to form family ties in a differentiated manner.
In Part I, we will discuss the areas of family law in which cohabitation may be
relevant-sexual couples and parenthood, as well as the laws involving non-
conjugal relations, laws of incest, elder law, welfare and tax law, zoning, and rent
control. We will point out how cohabitation is imbued with legal import
inconsistently and with little theoretical justification, We point to how cohabitation
is too often used as a proxy for sex when linked to legal familial status. Moreover,
cohabitation has been used to create legal rights in relation to third parties such as
the state in a much more expansive manner than it creates obligations between
cohabitants. This distinction should be analyzed, and family law should be more in
line with other legal doctrines. On the whole, we conclude that cohabitation as a
legal category, particularly when divorced from sexuality, has received too little
attention and can be a useful tool to uncovering what is important in familial
recognition.
In Part II, we define cohabitation as a separate legal category outside of the
realm of sexual relations and sexual reproduction. We consider why, normatively,
one might care about cohabitation and the benefits and support structure it
provides. Cohabitation over an extended period of time that involves joint living
creates a tangible amount of interdependency, both financial and emotional We
rely on social science studies and empirical accounts to demonstrate the centrality
and importance of home life. Cohabitation provides varying degrees of
interdependency, security, stability, support, and intimacy among those who live
together. These characteristics affect cohabitants regardless of sexuality. Home
sharing provides many of the benefits of a traditional nuclear family and thus is
relevant in the state's support and recognition of alternative family forms. In this
part, we will also consider potential drawbacks of creating legal categories based on
cohabiting; in particular, we discuss recent criticism against the domestic sphere as
recreating privacy and hierarchy in a potentially dangerous manner. We also take
seriously the legitimacy of other factors in recognizing the legal family. Therefore,
our recommendations do not include broad recognition of cohabitants as a legal
family but nuanced and limited recognition, as will be outlined in the third part.
[Vol. 104
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In Part III, we lay out the different possibilities for how the law should reflect
joint living in family life. In addressing these questions, we propose a modest but
significant legal arena for cohabitation as one of several building blocks in creating
a more diverse field of familial forms. In particular, we argue that cohabitation,
when combined with economic sharing, should result in certain property rights
between cohabitants. And we argue that cohabitation, when coupled with caring,
may result in streamlined rights and obligations regarding children. Finally,
cohabitation alone, when not coupled with sharing or caring, could be supported by
the state through a system of voluntary registration. When formally registered,
cohabitation would create certain mutual obligations between cohabitants as well as
in relation to third parties depending on the election of the parties involved.
I. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION IN DEFINING THE FAMILY
Various legal doctrines attribute significance to the fact that people live or have
lived together in shaping and defining familial rights and responsibilities. Yet, this
recognition is sporadic and inconsistent. Other doctrines fail to attribute any
meaning to cohabitation at all. Indeed, other indicators of family, such as biology,
marriage, and functional care have been much more significant in forming family
ties than cohabitation. In the absence of a clear rule with theoretical support, legal
doctrines give varying degrees of weight and importance to cohabitation, ranging
from treating it as the basis of legal rights and obligations, to using it as one factor
in determining rights and obligations, to ignoring cohabitation altogether. A broad
conceptualization of these differences, particularly in the context of considering
cohabitation in a manner divorced from sexuality, that explains and justifies such
distinctions is missing from the literature.33 Without such justifications, biases or
hidden, unwanted assumptions may underlie these distinctions. Indeed, many of
these rules only recognize cohabitation when it supports traditional perceptions of
the family. Cohabitation is therefore often invoked when dealing with the sexual
family or the functional equivalent thereof, and yet is ignored when involving non-
traditional family forms. However, the legal import of cohabitation, if used
consistently, can support legal recognition to a broader range of familial forms,
creating rights and obligations beyond the sexual family. The progressive potential
of cohabitation as a source of obligation that acknowledges new families and
different lifestyles is largely overlooked in current legal analysis because legal
recognition of sexual cohabitation tends to reinforce traditional conceptions of the
nuclear family.
"3 In the context of cohabitation that assumes sexuality, Cynthia Bowman has considered legal
recognition in depth. See generally Cynthia Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the
United States, 26 LAW & POL'Y. 119 (2004) (discussing the different ways states treat cohabitation in
the context of same-sex and heterosexual couples).
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In this part, we will first outline a range of legal doctrines, pointing to the
varying legal significance of cohabitation. Then, we will describe how current
doctrine inconsistently attributes significance to cohabitation, mirroring traditional
notions of the sexual family and often downplaying cohabitation's progressive
potential.
A. The Doctrine
1. Parenthood: Cohabitation as a Proxy for Care-Parents and children do not
have to live together. Parents may get divorced, or one parent may move to another
city or country, but they still remain legal parents of their children. And,
increasingly, children are born out of wedlock and never live with their parents at
all." While many parents live with their children, creating a dear and logical
association between parenthood and cohabitation, there is no requirement to
cohabit with a child in order to be recognized as a legal parent. Cohabitation
between parents and children is necessary to provide for their children's care and
safety, but as long as one parent or an agent of such a parent resides with and cares
for the child, legal parenthood is not broken for lack of cohabitation.35 If both
parents were to abandon their child, neither living with the child nor providing for
the child's habitation with a responsible adult, this would constitute abuse and
neglect, threatening and ending the legal relationship between parent and child.3 6
Thus, although cohabitation is certainly not required for defining legal parenthood,
providing for a responsible adult to cohabit with a child is a necessary element of
retaining parenthood.
The importance of cohabitation in defining parenthood can be seen in other
modern developments in family law. Cohabitation has been recognized as an
important component in the definition of parental roles in the context of functional
parenthood. For example, the ALI's Principles propose two new legal statuses for
See Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, Facts, and Solutions, in
MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-
FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 142, 145 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012). However,
many children born out of wedlock are born to cohabiting couples. Id. at 145.
" See generally David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPPLEMENT) 125 (2006)
(discussing the legal concept of parenthood).
3 See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 34, Westlaw (database updated November 2015). For
examples of how states define child abuse and neglect, see generally U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT? (2013),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/whatiscan.pdf. As an example, the Utah Juvenile Court Act,
defines "abuse" as "(i) nonaccidental harm of a child; (ii) threatened harm of a child; (iii) sexual
exploitation; or (iv) sexual abuse" and "neglect," in relevant part, as "(i) abandonment of a child... ; [or]
(iii) failure or refusal of a parent, guardian, or custodian to provide proper or necessary subsistence,
education, or medical care, or any other care necessary for the child's health, safety, morals, or well-
being." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-105(1)(a), (27)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec.
Sess.).
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parents: parent by estoppel and de facto parent.37 These statuses acknowledge the
parental status of parties who function as parents without a biological or formal
legal relationship with the child. A de facto parent is an individual who, although
not acknowledged by the legal parent as a co-parent, provides the majority of
caretaking for a child, or at least as much as a legal parent with whom the child
primarily lives, and who has lived with the child for a significant span of time, a
period of at least two years.3" A parent by estoppel is acknowledged by the legal
parent as a co-parent and is obligated to pay child support or is an individual who,
among other things, has lived with the child for at least two years or since the
child's birth.3 9 Thus, in order to be considered an alternative form of parent, living
with the child is, for the most part, essential, according to the ALI Principles 40 and
the cases that have established de facto parenthood or parenthood by estoppel
modeled on the ALl Principles.4 1 Co-residence is understood in such contexts to
strengthen relationships and reflect commitment.4 2
While underneath the functional parenthood status of the ALI Principles it is
functioning as a parent and caretaking that is essential to the functional parenthood
statuses of de facto parenthood and parenthood by estoppel described above,
cohabitation is used as a required indicator of the intensive caregiving relationship
that must be established to create these parental statuses. There are other situations
in which cohabitation can be used as a strong indicator of required care. Opening
one's home to a child can also be seen as accepting a commitment to care for him
or her in the context of establishing paternity. According to California's Family
Code, a man is presumed to be a child's natural father if "[he] receives the child
into his ... home and openly holds out the child as his ... natural child."43 In In re
Nicholas H., the court emphasized the importance of co-residence by conflating
love and home: "[w]hile his presumed father is providing a loving home for him,
his mother has not done so, and his biological father, whose identity has never been
judicially determined, has shown no interest . . ."4 In addition, the Uniform
Parentage Act § 204(a)(5) creates a presumption of paternity to an unmarried man
37 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 2.03(1).
' Id. § 2.03(l)(c).
39 Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
o See id. § 2.03(1).
See, e.g., V.C. v. MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551-52 (NJ. 2000) (requiring cohabitation as one of the
four elements necessary for obtaining the status of de facto parent); A.F. v. D.L.P., 771 A.2d 692, 697-
99 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (finding the cohabitation element was not met for creating a do
facto parenthood relationship and obtaining visitation rights).
42 See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALl Domestic Partner
Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, U. CHI. LEGAL F., 2004, at 358, 362 (praising how the
ALl Principles reflect the relevance and importance of a variety of committed relationships that nurture
children).
43 CAL FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 807 of
2015 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015-2016 2nd Exec. Sess.).
" In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 933 (Cal. 2002) (emphasis added).
2015-2016]
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who for the first two years of the child's life resided in the same household with the
child and openly held out the child as his own." The home therefore serves as a
metaphor for accepting a child into one's most intimate space, and providing the
child physical and emotional shelter, thus signaling that an individual treats the
child as his or her own.
6
Thus, we see that when steps are taken to imbue non-traditional family forms
with legal meaning, cohabitation is used as a proxy for ensuring a minimal level of
caregiving as well as reflecting the traditional nuclear family form. Using
cohabitation as a proxy for caregiving may be seen as a tool for progressive family
formation by imbuing new familial forms with legal status. 47 We contend, however,
that requiring cohabitation in order to create familial status can exclude other forms
of family formation when appropriate, as these forms do not parallel the
cohabitation usually found in the traditional nuclear family.4 Making cohabitation
a requirement could undermine other deep-seated functional care relationships. In
this context, we therefore can see how cohabitation may be used to create new
family forms, while also being used to ensure certain traditional parallels with the
sexual family.
2. Partnership: Cohabitation as a Proxy for Sex-The cohabitation of married
or unmarried couples is legally significant in a number of ways. For married
couples, it is used as a proxy for functioning sexual relationships. For instance,
when a married couple shares a home, it raises the presumption that the
relationship is worldng well enough to be left alone. In other words, cohabitation
protects the sexual family from legal interference. As McGuire v. McGuire
famously determined, courts will normally not enforce a financial support duty if
the married couple is cohabiting and not legally separated. 49 Similarly, in
California, as well as other states, when spouses live together during the time a
child is conceived, the husband is conclusively presumed to be the father of any
45 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2002).
' For other cases that emphasize co-residence, see Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 151, 154-55
(Alaska 2002); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 668-69 (Cal. 2005).
47 See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995) (applying four-prong
test including cohabitation for determining psychological parenthood); Middleton v. Johnson, 633
S.E.2d 162, 167-70, 172-73 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (granting visitation to mother's former boyfriend,
who fiflflUcd the four prong te3t for being a de facto or psychological parent); Surles v. Mayer, 628
S.E.2d 563, 572-73 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that mother's former boyfriend, who had cohabited
with her for almo3t three years and had been the fisnctional equivalent of a 3tepparent to the child, had
standing as a "person with a legitimate interest" to seek visitation); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d
539, 551-52 (N.J. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005).
4 See A.F. v. D.L.P., 771 A-2d 692, 699-701 (NJ. Super. Cr. App. Div. 2001) (holding that lack
of cohabitation precluded parental status even after petitioner't history of caring for the child).
4 McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953).
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children born during such time period."0 If a married couple is living apart at the
time the child is born, the husband is only the presumed father of the child."' Thus,
cohabitation creates a signal that the marriage is essentially functioning as it is
supposed to be, buttressing the formal marital status.
When formal marital status does not exist between conjugal couples,
cohabitation could potentially take on even more significance. Without formal
marital ties to establish relationships, cohabitation can be used to establish legal
recognition and status in a manner similar if not equivalent to marriage.12 Legal
status is attributed to cohabitants even without registration as domestic partners in
the state of Washington, 3 less consistently in some other states, 4 and in a number
of foreign countries,5 5 as well as according to the recommendations of the ALI
Principles. 6 According to the ALI Principles, the division of property between
domestic partners should be the same as between a married couple, unless it is
proven that, despite living together, the couple did not share a life together as a
couple. 7 Scholars have similarly advocated for imposing the legal status of
cohabitation on cohabitants regardless of registration in order to protect vulnerable
parties. 5 For instance, Cynthia Bowman argues that many of the benefits awarded
0 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117-19, 122, 131-32 (1989); Ferdinand S. Tinio,
Annotation, Presumption of Legitimacy of Children Born After Annulment, Divorce, or Separation, 46
A.L.R.3d § 21 (1972).
"' CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West, Wesdaw through all 2015 Reg. Sess. laws and Ch. 1 of
2015-2016 2nd Exec. Sess.); see also Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matterin FamilyLawv?,
13 J.L. &.FAM. STUD. 289, 289 (2011). Under many of these statutes, the presumption can be rebutted
by scientific evidence. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 204(a), 204(b), 631(1) (NATL CONFERENCE
OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002).
52 Cf Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1570, 1634 (2009) (discussing the treatment and legal
regulation of un-married cohabitants).
13 See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834, 837 (Wash. 1995) (providing property distribution
for committed, intimate, unmarried cohabitants); see also Van Allen v. Weber, Nos. 42169-1-I,
42569-6-11, 2012 WL 6017690, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2012); Ross v. Hamilton, No. 39887-7-
11, 2011 WL 1376767, at *3-*4 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2011).
"4 See, e.g., Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 438 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that the court may order
support or equitable distribution of property between unmarried cohabitants under state law); Shuraleff
v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 769 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
" For Israeli law, see Shabar Lifshitz, A Potential Lesson from the Israeli Experience for the
American Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 22 BYUIJ. PUB. L. 359, 362-65 (2008). For Austria, Germany,
and Norway, see Brienna Perelli-Harris & Nora Sdinchez Gassen, How Similar are Cohabitation and
Marriage? Legal Approaches to Cohabitation Across Western Europe, 38 POPULATION & DEV. REV.
435, 447, 460 (2012).
56 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, §§ 6.01(1); 6.03(1)-(4), (6); 6.04(2).
17 See id. § 6.04.
11 See, e.g., CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
242 (2010) (ebook); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective,
28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1165-68 (1981); William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of
Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1681-82
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to married couples should be extended to unmarried cohabitants if they lived
together for more than two years and had a child together.
5 9
However, in the vast majority of cases in the United States, cohabitation alone
is not reason enough to award one partner a share of the property accumulated
during the cohabitation period by the other partner even when cohabitants are
intimate.' Indeed, until fairly recently, in many states in the United States,
unmarried cohabitation was a criminal offense and contracts between unmarried
cohabitants were considered unenforceable.61 Since the landmark case of Marvin v.
Marvin,' courts have enforced express and even implied agreements between
cohabitants, if and when such agreements can be proven. 63 However, many states
will not allow implied contracts between cohabitants, 6 4 although some may still
accept narrow unjust enrichment claims.65 Additionally, cohabitants seeking to
enforce a Marvin contract have had limited success due to lack of evidence that an
agreement or unjust enrichment actually existed. 66 At best, the inquiry in such cases
seems to be whether the cohabitation mirrors a marital relationship, and the closer
it comes to marriage, the better chance a party has at succeeding in a Marvin
claim.67 However, creating an actual legal category that would apply to cohabitants
based on their actions alone has only been minimally adopted in the United
States.68 The reason for avoiding imposing such a status upon cohabiting couples,
(1984); Ira Mark Ellrnan, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal FMaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1365, 1365-66 (2001).
s BOWMAN, supra note 56, at 225-26, 228.
6) Berenson, supra note 49, at 297 (stating that these jurisdictions have followed the rule set in
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (Cal. 1976)).
6 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus,
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO L.J. 1881, 1928 (2012); Harry G. Prince, Public Policy
Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unnly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163, 191-
93 (1985).
62 Marvin, 557 P.2d 106.
63 See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Alaska 1980); Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923,
925, 929 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc); Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1268-69 (Colo. 2000) (en banc);
Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662, 666 (D.C. 1984); Kinkenon v. Hue, 301 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Neb.
1981); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 673, 675 (Nev. 1984); In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838,
847 (NJ. 2002); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510-11 (Or. 1978) (en banc); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d
1090, 1093-94 (R-I. 2002); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 316 (Wis. 1987); Bums v. Koellmer, 527
A.2d 1210, 1212, 1217-18 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1332 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980); Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595, 598-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (applying this rule
cautiously); Collins v. Davis, 315 S.E.2d 759, 762 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), affd per curiam, 321 S.E.2d
892 (N.C. 1984); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A-2d 553, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
' See, e.g., Merrill v. Davis, 673 P.2d 1285, 1286 (N.M. 1983); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d
1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980).
65 See, e.g., Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Mass. 1998).
6 See, e.g., Merle H. Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or Share, 59
VILL. L. REV. 135, 144-46 (2014).
67 See Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1930.
' See In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 772-73 (Wash. 2000) (en banc); Charlotte K.
Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13
WM. &MARYJ. WOMEN &L. 483, 490,537 (2007).
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absent some finding of a contractual obligation, is that it is considered paternalistic
and an intrusion on the autonomous choice to be in a relationship that is different
from marriage and does not have similar rights and obligations.
69
On the other hand, there are a growing number of states that have some form
of registration for domestic partnerships that provide legal status to unmarried
cohabitants.7 ° Once cohabitants register as domestic partners, they enjoy some or
all of the benefits of marriage, depending on state law.71 A number of the domestic
partner laws are intended only for use by homosexual couples.72 Others provide
registration only for intimate couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual, by
prohibiting partnerships between family members.73 Some civil union statutes do
not require cohabitation, but other domestic partner statutes are based on and
require joint domesticity, thus the terminology: "domestic partners."74 These
registration systems have a variety of requirements based on age, biological relation,
and numbers of persons as well, but all are intended for sexual couples whether
same-sex or opposite sex.75 Some proposals do not require domestic partners to be
conjugal, although except for Hawaii, no state within the United States, has not
adopted this version of domestic partnerships.76
Cohabitation can also be used to prove the existence of marriage-like
relationships when couples are not registered as married. 77 When the act of being
married itself is prohibited by law, such as in the case of antiquated laws against
misogyny and modem laws against bigamy, cohabitation may be evidence of
marriage. If marriage is not available to a couple due to laws that makes such
69 See Lifshitz, supra note 50, at 1624.
"' See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-104(1) (West, Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of
the 70th General Assemb. (2015)); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-702(a) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 29,
2015); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of the
General Assemb.); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 122A.100 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective
through June 30, 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.07 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60).
71 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-702(a) (Westlaw).
7 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(4) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 807 of 2015 Reg. Sess. and
Ch. 1 of the 2015-2016 2nd Exec. Sess.) (allowing opposite-sex couples to register only if one of them is
over the age of 62 but allowing same-sex couples to register without restriction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 202 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch. 193).
7 See infra notes 346-348 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710(2)(B) (Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess. of
the 127th Leg. (the general effective date is Oct. 15. 2015)) ("Domestic partners may become registered
domestic partners if [they] have been legally domiciled together in this State for at least 12 months
preceding the filing .... "); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c-115 and
J.R No. 7).
5 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (Westlaw) (defining "domestic partners" as two same-sex
adults, unrelated by blood and over the age of 18, and allowing opposite-sex adult couples to register if
one or both of the persons are over the age of 62).
76 See infra notes 347-348 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 83 (Va. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 1, 4
(1967) (cohabiting as man and wife in Virginia where mixed race marriages were not permitted was
taken as evidence of an illegal marriage).
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marriages illegal, how can prosecution for breaking such a law be enforced? For
example, if one cannot register to marry two wives, how can the existence of the
second wife be proven? Cohabitation and joint living have therefore been used as a
proxy for a marriage that cannot be otherwise formally registered.78 While the
traditional elements of common law marriage boil down to intent to marry,
capacity to marry, and consummation of the marriage, and thus do not necessarily
require cohabitation, in practice, cohabitation is essential to proving intent and
consummation of the marriage and thus is rarely, if ever, missing from couples
adjudicated to be married by common law, and it has been included as a
requirement in common law marriage statutes.
79
Even those who support legal recognition-with or without registration-of
unmarried cohabitating couples do not endorse a similar recognition of living apart
together ("LAT") relationships.' LAT is a form of committed relationship that
does not include a shared residency, and some scholars consider it a new family
form,81 particularly suitable for older divorcees, widows, and widowers who wish to
develop intimate relations but still maintain a significant degree of autonomy.
82
This committed relationship that does not include cohabitation is not recognized
by either the law or progressive calls for reform.83 The lack of support for LAT
relationships points to the relevance of cohabitation in modem configurations of
expanding family forms, at least among sexual couples. Although cohabitation
alone has had limited influence as a legal status, the existence of cohabitation
remains central to recognizing alternative forms of family life.
Domestic violence laws have extended their protection to non-married
cohabitants who have conjugal relations in a manner that mirrors married sexual
couples. However, other cohabitants do not always enjoy specialized domestic
violence protections. In Ohio, as well as other states, such cohabitation provisions
in domestic violence protection orders can enable same-sex couples, as well as
heterosexual non-married couples, to benefit from domestic violence protection.
84
Thereby, same-sex couples were able to benefit from such laws, despite the Ohio
Defense of Marriage Law, which prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages by
7 See, e.g., id. at 83.
9 See In re Estate of Love, 618 S.E.2d 97, 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) ("To constitute a valid
marriage in this state, there must be-number one; parties able to contract. Number two; an actual
contract and number three: consummation according to law."); see also Piel v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 90,
94-95 (Ala. 1978) (explaining that continuous cohabitation is an element of common law marriage in
order to prove consummation of the marriage, which is sometimes listed instead of the elements of
continuous cohabitation and holding out to the public as being married ),
' CE Irene Levin & Jan Trost, Living Apart Together, 2 COMMUNITY, WORK & FAM. 280
(1999) (discussing LAT relationships).
81 See id at 281.
s See Sofie Ghazanfareeon Karlsson & Klas Borell, Intimacy and Autonomy, Gender and Ageing:
LivingApart Together, 27 AGEING INT'L, Fall 2002, at 11, 17-18.
8 See Berenson, supra note 49, at 317-19.
8 See, e.g., State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio 2007).
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constitutional amendment.8" The Ohio Supreme Court has held that
cohabitation-at least when there are conjugal relations-creates a separate legal
category other than marriage that can benefit from the protection of the domestic
violence statute.
6
However, roommates, intergenerational families, and other cohabitants who do
not have sex or other familial status often do not similarly benefit from the
protections of domestic violence laws. 7 There is indeed something about sexual
intimacy that makes such protections particularly necessary. However, living
together and sharing space, even when not coupled with sex, can make domestic
violence similarly intimidating and problematic due to the joint living and
interdependency that can create vulnerability.8 All "household" members could
benefit from domestic violence protections.
Regarding couples, cohabitation therefore has limited legal impact that remains
in the realm of the sexual family, as it is used to create legal rights in the United
States only among sexual couples. And, even among sexual couples, the legal
relevance of cohabitation is limited. However, cohabitation is still relevant in
considering progressive reforms, as can be understood from the lack of support for
LAT relationships. Cohabitation has thus been primarily a conservative force that
provides some rights and obligations in limited circumstances when conjugal
unmarried couples act in a manner that mirrors married couples. This does provide
some equity to those who choose not to marry, but the relief is limited to those in
sexual relationships that come as close as possible to what traditional marriage
looks like, including specialization, long-term commitment, and joint expenditures.
Couples who do not have sex anymore may still be considered to be cohabiting, but
the existence of a sexual component at the beginning of the relationship is
essential.8 9 Sexuality, then, is usually perceived as a key component of both
marriage and cohabitation. 90
To sum up, under current law, cohabitation essentially depicts sexual relations
without marriage. However, cohabitation could be the basis of a legal category that
is much more expansive. Yet, currently, only sexual cohabitants benefit from even
the limited legal support described above.
15 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Files 1 to 31, 40 and
45 of the 131st General Assemb. (2015-2016) and 2015 State Issues 1 and 2), declared unconstitutional
by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
6 See Carswell, 871 N.E.2d at 554.
'7 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 683 N.E.2d 1126, 1128-31 (Ohio 1997) (holding that the offense of
domestic violence between cohabitants arises out of a relationship, and not marital status, but must
consist of consortium); City of Cleveland v. Johnson, 19 N.E.3d 604, 607 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)
(finding domestic violence between non-married couple where they were "living as [ spouse[s]").
'8 See infra Part HI.B.
19 See infra Part H.B.
9 See Rubin v. Joseph, 213 N.Y.S. 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926); Steinberger v. Steinberger, 33
N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940); see also Perry, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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3. Capacity to Marry: When Biology and Cohabitation Conflict-At times,
cohabitation is not used as a proxy for sex or care, but rather, it conflicts with the
norms of sexual reproduction. This is especially evident in incest. Stepchildren and
adoptive children live with parents and non-biologically related children in a
household. While the vertical authority between parents and children may be
retained in a manner that mimics the sexual family, the biological link is clearly
missing. Thus, the question then becomes whether cohabitation is sufficient to
create a family life that prohibits incest or whether the sexual family is the only real
basis for prohibiting interfamily sexual relations. Indeed, although adopted children
may be raised together with sexual children and be treated as "natural" children for
nearly all intents and purposes, incest laws that prohibit marriage between siblings
are frequently relaxed when blood is not involved.91 Moreover, stepchildren who
cohabit with their parents' spouses are not prohibited from marrying parental
figures with whom they have lived.92
Accordingly, although cohabitation may be used as a proxy for family in certain
situations, it is clearly a lesser category that can be put aside when biology and
sexuality are missing. Cohabitation is merely a proxy for family, and in many states,
it is not recognized for the levels of intimacy that occur due to cohabitation alone.
Such cohabitation and intimacy may make marriage between siblings through
adoption problematic as sexuality and familial intimacy are intertwined. Home
should ideally be a safe place for children in which sexual interaction is
inappropriate. Preventing sexual abuse and exploitation of children relies on
recognizing the intimate nature of the cohabitating family.93 Indeed, potentially
abusive sexual relations are much more common between parental figures and
adoptive children or stepchildren than with biological children.9 4 Such delicacy may
" See Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978) (finding no legitimate interest in
prohibiting marriage between siblings related by adoption); Ex parte Bournej 2 N.W.2d 439j 440
(Mich. 1942) (holding that a sexual relationship between a stepfather and stepdaughter is not
incestuous); State v. Bale, 512 N.W.2d 164, 165-66 (S.D. 1994) (holding incest statute was not violated
by relationship between father and adopted daughter); In re Anonymous, 135 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 31
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981) (holding that because incest statute was inapplicable to parties without blood ties,
adoption proceeding by two homosexual adults wishing to establish legally cognizable relationship was
allowable); see also Walter J. Wadlington, m, The Adopted Child and Intra-Family Marriage
Prohibitions, 49 VA. L. REV. 478, 478-79 (1963). See generally Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92
NW. U. L. REV. 1501 (1998). Other states do include adoptive relatives in incest laws. See Naomi
Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1140-46, 1144 n.322 (2003)
(citing Model Penal Code § 230.2 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
9 For instance, see the famous case of Woody Allen marrying his wife's adopted daughter with
whom he had cohabited. See Glenn Collins, Mixed Reviews Greet Woody Allen Maage, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1997, at B3.
9' See Cahn, supra note 89, at 1143-44.
9' See Linda Gordon & Paul O'Keefe, Incest as a Form of Family Violence: Evidence from
Historical Case Records, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 27, 30-31 (1984) (reporting on case records from
1880 to 1960, with non-biological fathers including step-, foster-, and adoptive-fathers); Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Children at Risk- The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L.
[Vol. 104
Family Formation and the Home
be less relevant if siblings through adoption do not live in the same home, stressing
how cohabitation creates an important element for consideration in family law. In
laws of incest, blood relationships are obviously central, but the nature of intimacy
in the home, particularly in the context of parenthood, is also worth considering
with regard to capacity to marry.
4. Care for Dependent Relatives: New Parameters for the Home and the
Family--For the most part, adult family members who live together without any
other biological or legal connection have no special legal status or legal obligations
to one another.95 The lack of sexuality or resemblance to a sexual or reproductive
relationship leaves the law out of these relationships altogether. The lack of legal
status for adult family members who cohabit, as well as unrelated or uninvolved
roommates, demarks a clear differentiation between the sexual and asexual family.
One state, however, has started to give some legal recognition to those who care
for dependent relatives outside of the sexual family. Illinois has a unique rule that
encourages family members to live with their elderly or disabled relatives and care
for them." To date, no other state has a similar rule.97 Under this law, a relative
who has provided in-home care for at least three years will be able to bring a claim
against the estate upon the death of the disabled person.98 In addition, the court
may authorize and direct the guardian of the estate to make conditional gifts from
the estate to the live-in caregiver that will be distributed after the death of the
disabled relative.99 Generally, the provision allows family members to recover "the
additional opportunity and emotional costs of committing their lives to disabled
relatives,"'0° and the legislature chose to encourage private care by rewarding
immediate family members.' The provision does not deal with compensation for
damages, but rather with awarding certain relatives for "the often unseen and
intangible sacrifices made, and opportunities forgone" when a family member
commits his life to "making the lives of disabled persons better." 2
REV. 251, 262-66 (2001); see also Margaret Mead, Anomalies in American Post-Divorce
Relationships, in DIVORCE AND AFTER 97-112 (1970) (advocating preserving home and family for
non-sexual affection).
9' See generally Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 8.
96 See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-1.1 (West, Westiaw through P.A. 99-482 of the 2015
Reg. Sess. (excluding P.A. 99-480)).
' For a discussion of the Illinois rule and other, different elder care rules in the law of succession,
ee Thomas P. Gallanis &Josephine Cittler, Family Caregiving and the Lail of Succecsion: A Proposal,
45 MICH. J.L. REFORM 761, 771-73 (2012).
91 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-1.1 (Westlaw). For a discussion of the provision, see Heather
M. Fossen Forrest, Comment, Loosening the Wrapper on the Sandwich Generation: Private
Compensation for Family Caregivers, 63 LA. L. REV. 381, 401-07 (2003).
" 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/lla-18.1(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-482 of the 2015
Reg. Sess. (excluding P.A. 99-480)).
l" In re Estate of Jolliff, 771 N.E.2d 346, 351 (Ill. 2002) (discussing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/18-1.1 (Westlaw)).
... See id. at 356.
152 Id. at 350.
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A caretaker, according to the rule, is someone who "dedicates himself or herself
to the care of the person with a disability by living with and personally caring for
the person with a disability for at least [three] years."'0 3 The court interprets these
conditions strictly. For example, two and half years of care has been deemed
insufficient.'0 4 Also, living with the disabled has been construed as not being
equivalent to excessive visiting, but requiring some sort of shared living
arrangement.' 5 The rule reflects an assumption that caring for someone becomes
more dedicated, committed, and beneficial when the caretaker resides with the
disabled person. Cohabitation is thus indicative of commitment, and it is a
necessary element in obtaining the gift. However, the potential of focusing on care,
commitment, and communal life is restricted only to immediate familial
relationships, defined by marriage and biological relations.
According to the rule, in order to receive the gift, a caretaker must be "[a]
spouse, parent, brother, sister, or child of a person with a disability,""° and the
court has explained that this is the "class of persons most likely to provide dedicated
residential and personal care with a loving and altruistic motive."107 This
justification reinforces the traditional definition of the family as the primary
provider of care, but it leaves out two important care providers. First, in-laws are
left out of the definition, despite the fact that daughters-in-law often provide
valuable care to their parents-in-law.0 8 Second, the definition currently excludes
non-related caretakers. Thus, if the disabled person is cared for by a friend or
longtime companion, this type of care will not be compensated.
The Illinois rule assumes that a clear distinction can be made between egoistic
and altruistic motives. However, it is doubtful that such a dear line of separation
can be made, especially considering the law gives a financial reward termed a "gift"
for the care. °9 Yet, this line of reasoning reflects an important agenda. The value of
personal care, not triggered by immediate consideration, is considered higher for
the disabled person (and perhaps also for society) than hired care or even care that
103 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-1.1 (Westlaw).
In re Estate of Riordan, 814 N.E.2d 597, 598-600 (IlL. App. Ct. 2004).
Io6 d. at 599-600; see also In re Estate of Hoehn, 600 N.E.2d 899, 899-900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(living across the hall is not equivalent to living with the disabled person).
106 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18-1.1 (Westlaw).
107 Jolliff, 771 N.E.2d at 354.
"os See generally Deborah M. Merrill, Daughters-in-Law as Caregivers to the Elderly. Defining the
In-Law Relationship, 15 RES. ON AGING 70 (1993) (arguing that daughters-in-law assist with as many
caregiving tasks and are as likely to perceive themselves as the primary caregiver, but daughters-in-law
provide, on average, six fewer hours of care per week compared to daughters); Norah D. Peters-Davis, et
al., Children-in-Law in Caregiving Families, 39 GERONTOLOGIST 66 (1999) (explaining that the
experience of caregiving is very similar for biological children and children-in-law in caregiving
families).
" See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Money, Caregiving, and Kinship: Should Paid Caregivers
Be Allowed to. Obtain De Facto Parental Status?, 74 MO. L. REv. 25 (2009) (critiquing rigid
differentiation of commercial and intimate caregiving work).
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is done out of non-altruistic motives. Still, cohabitants of all forms who are caring
for dependents, whether or not caregivers who are receiving immediate
contribution, may be essentially interconnected and engage in mutually beneficial
relationships worthy of legal recognition. Although limited, the Illinois statute
presents a new vision for recognizing the need for legal support of cohabitants even
in the non-sexual family. 10
5. Welfare and Tax Benefits--Welfare benefits have important financial
advantages for low-income families."' Tax benefits can be equally advantageous for
middle- and high-income families." 2 Because these rights and benefits are
occasionally awarded to a family and not to an individual, the legal definition of a
family may prove to have considerable economic implications.
Stephen D. Sugarman argues that some public programs have a flexible
definition of family, while others are stricter and fail to acknowledge diverse
familial typec."' An example of the inclusive approach is evident in food Stamp
benefits." 4 Food stamp programs provide funds for low-income families for the
purchase of specific food items. The program is structured around household
eligibility and employs a broad definition of the household." 5 According to 7
U.S.C. § 2012, the definitional section for the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance
Program (commonly known as the food stamps program), a household is "a group
of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals
together for home consumption."1' 6 The definition looks into the living
arrangement and the economic function of a group, instead of the parties' formal
familial status. This broad recognition of informal relationships has been criticized
and Congress even attempted to repeal it. In 1971, the Act was amended to deny
food stamps from households containing adults who were not married to each
other or otherwise related." 7 This amendment was challenged and eventually
struck down by the Supreme Court.' The Court held that the new classification
of household was irrelevant for the purpose of the act, as it excluded "only those
persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter
their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility."" 9
11o See HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF
INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE 28-29 (2012) (discussing voluntary compensation for care through
inheritance).
... See Stephen D. Sugarman, What Is a "Family"? Conflicting Messages from Our Public
Programs, 42 FAM. L. Q. 231,245 (2008).
112 See id. at 241.
13 Id. at 232.
114 See id. at 241-42.
115 See id.
116 7 U.S.C. § 2012(m)(1)(B) (2014).
117 Sugarman, supra note 109, at 242.




Similarly, public housing benefits employ a broad definition of the family.
There are two major public housing schemes in the United States. The government
either owns housing units that are available to people in need at low cost or it
subsidizes rent of privately owned units for families in need. 20 There are several
eligibility requirements for public housing.' Yet, none of these requirements
stipulates that there must be a formal familial relationship. 122 Instead, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations define a
family a "a group of persons residing together."'23
On the other hand, tax law has a much stricter understanding of a household.
Federal income tax allows married couples to file joint returns.1 2" This rule allows
married couples to combine resources for tax purposes and gain an important
financial advantage because of the progressive tax regime.' 25 Couples can therefore,
if one of the two earns significantly less than the other, average down their income
gain."' This advantage is only available for married couples and was only recently
extended to same-sex married couples. 2 7 Single parent families can also enjoy tax
benefits. 12 However, other adults who live together and pool their resources, such
as unmarried couples or otherwise unrelated group of adults, do not enjoy the same
potential benefits.
This section provided three examples of benefits given to a group of individuals
who fimction as a single economic unit for a particular purpose. Food stamp
programs and public housing schemes employ a substantive definition of
household, focusing on cohabitation and the pooling of resources. Tax law on the
other hand, provides a formalistic definition, focusing on the traditional nuclear
family. The distinction between benefits for the poor and the provisions of tax law
that most affect the wealthy demonstrates incongruity and inconsistency and begs
for explanation and justification.
6. Rent Control & Land Use: The Refraining of Cohabitation in the Realm of
Property Law--Several jurisdictions have rent control rules that serve as
governmental housing regulations. New York City is particularly demonstrative, as
1" Sugarman, supra note 109, at 244.
121 See 24 C.F.R §5.403 (2011).
1 See id. But see Madeline Howard, Subsidized Housing Policy- Defining the Family, 22
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. &JusT. 97, 98 (2007) (criticizing the effect of zoning restrictions on public
housing benefits of low-income non-traditional families). It is dear from the analysis that these types of
families are indeed entitled to the benefits but are unable to integrate into stronger neighborhoods
because of zoning laws. See id.
1- 24 C.F.R. § 5.403.
124 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (2011).
125 Sugarman, supra note 109, at 238-39.
126 Id.
122 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682, 2694-96 (2013).
12 See Sugarman, supra note 109, at 239 (discussing how single parents can file as heads of
households and gain the benefits of lower marginal rates).
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it accounts for the city with the single largest number of rent control units.' 29
Moreover, its exceptional rent control regulations have spurred discussion by legal
scholars. 3 ° These regulations provide a rare example through which to explore the
potential cohabitation holds as a legal category decoupled from the sexual family.
The New York Rent and Eviction Regulations involve a uniquely broad definition
of familial relations that includes people unrelated to the tenant by blood or
marriage. In the 1980s, the New York City rent control regulation contained in
§ 2204.6(d) provided that upon the death of a rent control tenant, the landlord
could not evict "either the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other
member of the deceased tenant's family who ha[d] been living with the tenant."' 3'
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company, the court considered whether a same-sex
lifetime partner of the deceased tenant fell under the definition of "family" in the
regulation.'32
The court in Braschi concluded that the term family should not be restricted to
formal relations, but must take into account the "reality of family life." 33 The court
also discussed factors that distinguish between non-familial and familial
relationships in the home.' Among these are "the exclusivity and longevity of the
relationship, the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in
which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to
society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family services."
135
The New York Rent and Eviction Regulations have since embraced these
criteria. The current regulation stipulates that where a tenant has permanently
vacated the housing accommodation and "such family member has resided with the
"2 Edgar 0. Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy? 67 CIu.-KENT L. REV. 931, 931 (1991)
(stating that rent controls exist in six states-California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York-and the District of Columbia-and further stating that New York City accounts for
thirty-nine percent of all rent controlled units; Los Angeles, seventeen percent;, San Francisco, seven
percent, and Washington, D.C., four percent). Also, according to the New York Housing and Vacancy
Survey of 2011, there were 1,025,211 rent regulated units in New York City. Rent Stabilization in New
York City, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST. & URB. POL'Y,
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/HVSRentStabilization fact sheet FINAL-4.pdf (last
visited July 4, 2016).
" See generally Paris R Baldacci, Pushing the Law to Encompass the Reality of Our Families:
Protecting Lesbian and Gay Families from Eviction from Their Homes-Braschi'a Functional
Definition of "Family" and Beyond, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 973, 975-76 (1994); John G. Culhane, A
"Clanging Silence"- Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 911, 914-15, 922 (2001); Martha
Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 275 (1991);
William B. Rubenctein, 144e Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian
and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. & POL. 89, 89 (1991); Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of
Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of 'Family", 29 J. FAM. L.
497,501 (1990-91).
131 See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1989).
132Id. at 51.
133 Id. at 53.




tenant in the housing accommodation as a primary residence for a period of no less
than two years," he or she will be protected from eviction.'36 The definition of
"family member" is broad and includes formal relations, step-relations, in-laws, and
.any other person residing with the tenant in the housing accommodation as a
primary residence who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and
interdependence between such person and the tenant."'37 Evidence of such
commitment includes, for example, the longevity of the relationship, reliance on
each other for the payment of expenses or common necessities, intermingling of
finances, engagement in family-type activities, and formalization of legal
obligations.'
38
This innovative definition of "family" based on co-residence in the housing
context provides a different model for defining family and imbuing family with
legal meaning. The question is: why is this definition confined to the property
context, and what benefit could it provide if used more broadly? It is worth
considering the potential legal significance of interdependence and commitment-
as described in the rental and welfare benefit contexts-in other family law
contexts. In particular, it is worth evaluating the proper relation between
cohabitation and other relevant factors.
Zoning law provides an additional example of the gradual development of a
capacious definition of family that is based mostly on cohabitation. Interestingly,
the judicial tendency to focus on cohabitation as constitutive of a family developed
in order to counterbalance a restrictive approach of local zoning ordinances.
Certain ordinances limit residence in local districts to families only, as part of
general land-use planning. 3 9 Occasionally these ordinances define family narrowly
in order to regulate occupancy and exclude various types of living arrangements
from particular neighborhoods.
In the case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, for example, the zoning
ordinance employed a selective definition of family." ° The state did not recognize
116 N.Y. COMiP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d) (Westlaw through amendments included in
the New York State Register, Vol. XXXVII, Issue 44, dated Nov. 4, 2015).
137 Id. § 2204.6(d)(3).
138Id.
131 See infra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
" Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 531-33 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The city
had determined that:
Family' means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the household or
to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a single housekeeping unit in a
single dwelling unit, but limited to the following-
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the
nominal head of the household, provided, however, that such unmarried children have no
children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the
nominal head of the household.
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the Moore family, which included Inez Moore, her son, and her two grandsons,
Dale and John. 141 John came to live with his grandmother when he was a baby
following his mother's death and was a ten year old child at the time the case was
decided. 42 The household was not considered a family because John was not the
offspring of the son with which he was living, but rather the nephew, bringing too
many family lines to constitute one nuclear family. 143 The Supreme Court struck
down the ordinance, stating that the city could not standardize people's preferences
by "forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."' 4 The Court also
emphasized the importance of broader familial relations, including
intergenerational ties. 1
4 5
In Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, the ordinance at issue defined a family as
"one or more persons occupying a dwelling unit as a single non-profit
housekeeping unit, who are living together as a stable and permanent living unit,
being a traditional family unit or the functional equivalency [sic] thereof"'" The
New Jersey Supreme Court had to determine whether a group of ten college
students sharing a home together constituted a family according to the
ordinance. 47 The students each had a separate renewable lease for a semester-long
period. 4' The students shared a kitchen, ate together, and shared household
chores.'49 They also had a common checking account to pay for food and other
bills. 5 ° All of them planned to live in the house until graduation.15 ' Upon review,
the court decided that these ten college students living together did constitute a
family, because the occupancy showed stability, permanency, and could be
described as the functional equivalent of a family.' 5'
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may include not
more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of the household
or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the spouse and dependent children
of such dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a dependent person is one who
has more than fifty percent of his total support fimished for him by the nominal head of the
household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
Id.
141 Id. at 496.
142 See id. at 506 (Brennan, J., concurring).
143 See id. at 500.
1'4 Id. at 505-06.
145 See id. at 504-05.
146 Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 889 (N.J. 1990) (quoting GLASSBORO, NJ.
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 107-3 (1986)).
1
4 7 1d.









The courts in zoning cases typically employ a broad definition of "family." They
therefore use criteria such as "cohesiveness and permanence"'5 3 or whether there
exists a "stable and permanent living unit."' a This type of judicial inquiry equates
cohabitation with freedom of association, due to the threat of public intervention in
people's choice of home and cohabitants. Therefore, restrictions on these choices
are interpreted narrowly and occasionally struck down. This broader interpretation
of the family is quite progressive and is distinct from the way obligations and rights
are defined in traditional family law. Within family law, relationships are defimed
quite narrowly, with most roommates, cohabiting non-conjugal adult family
members, and even sexual cohabitants having little, if any, legal connection at all.
But when dealing with regulations that rest in property and zoning laws, the
definitions broaden.
Other land-use issues that involve cohabitation include fair housing and choice
of cohabitants. In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommate.com, LLC, the court had to decide whether the Fair Housing Act
applied to shared-living situations with regard to a commercial website that helped
people find roommates.'55 The website required users to disclose information about
their sex, sexual orientation, and familial status, and it matched potential
roommates accordingly' 6 The Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley
claimed that this requirement violated the Fair Housing Act.157 The court
determined, however, that if the Fair Housing Act were interpreted to apply to
"shared living situations," it would deprive people of their constitutional right of
association.' 8 This right includes "the freedom to enter into and carry on certain
intimate or private relationships."'59 "There is no indication," the Court explained,
"that Congress intended to interfere with personal relationships inside the
home."
160
For the purpose of our analysis, we leave aside the more general problem of fair
housing and focus on the portrayal of cohabitation. The court in Roomate.com
discussed intimacy in the home, and the inevitable compromise of privacy when
living with others:
"s Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14, 22 (Me. 1981).
54 Vallorosi, 568 A.2d at 894 (interpreting the Glassboro ordinance at issue).
"n Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1218,
1223 (9th Cir. 2012).
1"6 Id. at 1218.
157 Id.
"' Id. at 1220-22. For a critical analysis of the decision, see generally Tim Iglesias, Does Fair
Housing Law Apply to "Shared Living Situations"? Or the Trouble with Roommates, 22 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING &CoMMuNrryDEv. L. 111 (2014).
19 Roomate.com, 666 F.3d at 1220 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)).
" Id. (emphasis removed).
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Aside from immediate family or a romantic partner, it's hard to imagine a
relationship more intimate than that between roommates, who share living
rooms, dining rooms, kitchens, bathrooms, even bedrooms.... The home is the
center of our private lives. Roommates note our comings and goings, observe
whom we bring back at night, hear what songs we sing in the shower, see us in
various stages of undress and learn intimate details most of us prefer to keep
private. Roommates also have access to our physical belongings and to our
person.
161
The court's analysis draws on central characteristics of cohabitation to portray a
description of domesticity as a foundation for intimate relations. It expands the
right of association beyond the sexual family into a more flexible definition of
intimate relations. Most importantly, it recognizes the potentially intimate,
interdependent, and meaningful "home"-creating nature of cohabitation regardless
of sexuality.'62 Although we celebrate the part of the case that recognizes the
potential legal implications for non-familial cohabitation, we also acknowledge that
recognition of cohabitation has to be contextual and must meet minimal
requirements for joint living. Thus, while people who live together may be
cohabitating, they may also not be.' 63
B. Making Sense of the Doctrine: From Proxy to Substance
An analysis of the law of cohabitation reveals no unifying justificatory principle
that explains when and how cohabitation affects family formation. Within the
context of family law, the law focuses on legal recognition of the nuclear, sexual
family, and uses cohabitation as a proxy for the sexual family when for some
reasons formal indicators such as marriage or adoption are absent. These doctrines
use cohabitation to extend rights beyond the traditional family in a limited manner
and only in places that most resemble such families. However, when such rights are
in limited circumstances extended to unmarried conjugal families, whether due to a
Marvin contract, a registration system, or other protective statutes, cohabitation
remains central to recognizing the relevance of these alternative family forms
In other laws related to family formation, biology and marriage trump the
relevance of cohabitation significantly. Elder care rules in Illinois only compensate
spouses and blood relations for providing care to dependent relatives.'64 Similarly,
rules concerning capacity to marry define incest as based mostly on biological
affinity rather than the upbringing of children in the same home.165 And federal tax
,61 Id. at 1221.
162 See discussion infra Part I1 for our proposed legal definition of cohabitation that includes
minimum threshold requirements.
163 C£ Iglesias, supra note 156 (critiquing the Roomate.com opinion).
16 See supra Part I.A.4.
165 See supra Part I.A.3.
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law limits the possibility of filing joint returns to married couples."6 In all these
examples, cohabitation is rarely treated as an alternative foundation for intimate
relations, but rather, when recognized at all, it is treated as one of the ways to
establish the sexual family.
In contrast, other doctrines, such as rent control, land-use law, and food
stamps, go further in taking cohabitation seriously. Even when cohabitants are not
biologically related and do not have a conjugal relation, the significance of living
together is recognized by these laws. 67 Indeed, there is a substantial difference
between legal doctrines that provide rights and benefits in a very limited manner to
unmarried cohabitants and only when such cohabitants most mirror the sexual
family and zoning and other administrative doctrines that employ a more expansive
definition of family.
In zoning, fair housing law, and rent control, courts deal primarily with
freedom of association. The issue at hand is often whether or not a person can
choose his or her cohabitants. In the land use cases reviewed above, cohabitants did
not ask to be recognized as a family in terms of mutual rights and obligations, but
only to be allowed to continue to live together or to choose with whom they
cohabit. Indeed, rent control regulations address the right not to be evicted from
one's home. Similarly, public housing schemes and food stamp programs provide
financial benefits to certain households. Yet, these regulations do not affect familial
obligations between the parties, but rather a third party's (the landlord or the
government) obligation to respect the cohabitants. In contrast, doctrines
concerning partnership, parenthood, or care for dependents deal directly with
attributing familial rights and obligations between cohabitants. The law recognizes
plurality of lifestyle in the home usually when dealing with outside threats and not
with internal domestic conflicts.
Based on the doctrinal analysis in this section, we draw the following non-
exhaustive conclusions. First, given the contradictions and inconsistencies apparent
in our analysis, cohabitation deserves a systematic and comprehensive legal analysis.
It should be viewed as something substantive and not just a formal proxy for
sexuality. Cohabitation does not necessarily involve sexuality and involves its own
characteristics, interdependencies, and benefits. Too often in family law doctrine,
cohabitation is only used as a proxy for the sexual family and is not given
independent legal status. Thus, cohabitation should be separated from sexuality
and given its own legal relevance.
Second, in some contexts, particularly in family law, as when cohabitation is
required as a factor in legal doctrine to prove de facto parenthood, cohabitation haG
a restrictive and conservative effect, acting as a mirror to the sexual family. In other
contexts, requiring cohabitation may be logical in light of other factors involved.
However, to the extent possible, particularly in the context of custody and visitation
See supra Part I.A.5.
167 See supra Part LA.6.
[Vol. 104
Family Formation and the Home
of children where caregiving is also an essential factor, cohabitation should act as a
factor and not a limiting requirement in developing a modem doctrine of family
law. Care should be taken when incorporating cohabitation to make it a force of
progressive recognition of diverse familial forms and not a restrictive, traditionalist
requirement.
Third, strong justifications have been developed in administrative and property
law for separating sexuality and cohabitation and for recognizing how cohabitation
affects emotional and economic interdependencies in relationships that could
benefit from legal recognition in ways that have nothing to do with sexuality,
including freedom of association and freedom of joint intimacy. Cohabitation tends
to be more influential as a legal category against third parties as opposed to
obligations and rights between cohabitants. Family law can benefit from the
insights of administrative and property law in decoupling sexuality from
cohabitation and in recognizing the value of cohabitation divorced from marriage
and sexuality.
II. COHABITATION AS A LEGAL CATEGORY
Cohabitation is first and foremost a social phenomenon. It has social, cultural,
and psychological functions and is understood only against its societal context. 6 s
Because legal treatment of cohabitation has to be mindful of its social benefits and
risks, this Part looks into the phenomenon of cohabitation and examines its central
features. It then explores whether cohabitation can serve as a separate legal category
and the various strengths and weaknesses of such an approach.
A. Scope of Inquiry and Legal Definition of Cohabitation
Living arrangements in the United States have changed over time, and thus, it
is difficult to identify one predominant form. According to a report by the U.S.
Census Bureau, there are a diverse number of household formations.169 In 2012,
17.8% of American households included families living with children or other
relatives without the presence of a spouse. 7 ° Multigenerational households,
consisting of three or more generations living together, accounted for 5% of all
family households, although this percentage differed by race and national origin.
17
According to the report, "[m]ultigenerational households made up 3 percent of
16 On the interrelation of law and social sciences in cohabitation, see, for example, ANNE BARLOW
ET AL., COHABITATION, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: SOCIAL CHANGE AND LEGAL REFORM IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2005).
'69 SeeJONATHAN VESPA, ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, No. P20-570, AMERICA'S FAMILIES
AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2012,4 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf.
170 Id. at 5 fig.i. The report clarifies that an unmarried partner of the parent may or may not be
present. Id. n.11.
' Id. at 7.
2015-2016]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
family households with a White, non-Hispanic householder compared with 6
percent of those with an Asian reference person and 8 percent of those with a Black
or Hispanic reference person."'72 Another household pattern included parents
living with an adult child-16% of men and 10% of women aged twenty-five to
thirty-four were living with their parents.'73 Finally, 6.1% of all American
households included non-family households. 1 4 This data shows that cohabitation
is a diverse phenomenon encompassing various living arrangements, including
multigenerational and intergenerational households, groups of unrelated adults,
and unmarried couples. Cohabitation outside of the sexual family seems to be more
common in minority households, but it represents a significant percentage of living
arrangements overall.
For instance, intergenerational households are increasingly prevalent. American
adults in their twenties and early thirties are "more likely to be living with their
parents than in previous generations."'75 In fact, the centrality of the phenomenon
has been captured by recent media attention 176 and has drawn many references in
popular culture.' Moreover, it is a rising phenomenon not only in the United
States,'78 but it has actually become a global trend. 79 This pattern of cohabitation
has its roots in economic changes. The economic downturn and housing crisis
affect the opportunities of college graduates to become financially independent, and
1 Id. A householder is defined as "[o]ne of the people who owns or rents the residence." Id. at 2. A
referenced person is "the member[] of the household around whom [the] family unit[] is organized" Id.
at 12.
7 Id. at 9.
174 Id. at 5 fig. 1. According to the report, "[a] nonfamily household can be either a person living
alone or a householder who shares the housing unit only with nonrelatives for eumple, boarders or
roommates. The nonrelatives of the householder may be related to each other." Id. at 2. Yet, there is a
different percentage claiming to represent people living alone. In 2012, women living alone made up
15.2% of all households, men living alone made up 12.3%, and nonfamily households made up 6.1% of
all households. Id. at 5 fig 1.
175 Sharon Sassler et al., Are They Really Mama's Boys/Daddy's Girls? The Negotiation of
Adulthood Upon Returning to the Parental Home, 23 SOC. F. 670, 670-71 (2008).
176 See, e.g., Nancy Anderson, Boomerang Children Living at Home May Not Be Such a Bad
Thing, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2012, 10:15 AM), http://onforb.es/N648We; Adam Davidson, It's Official:
The Boomerang Kids Won't Leav4 N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 20, 2014), http://nyti.ms/lql8KgP.
"7 For movies, see, for example, LONESOME JIM (InDigEnt & Plum Pictures 2005); JEFF, WHO
LIVES AT HOME (Indian Paintbrush et al 2011); see also LINDA PERLMAN GORDON & SUSAN
MORRIS SHAFFER, MOM, CAN I MOVE BACK IN wITH YOU?: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR PARENTS
OF TWENTYSOMETHINGS (2004).
178 RICHARD FRY & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW RESEARCH CTR, IN POST-RECESSION ERA,
YOUNG ADULTS DRIVE CONTINUING RISE IN MULTI-GENERATIONAL LIVING (2014),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/07/ST-2014-07-17-multigen-households-report.pdf.
" See generally Clara H. Mulder, et al., A Comparative Analysis of Leaving Home in the United
States, the Netherlands and West Germany, 7 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 565 (2002). For Israel, see
generally Shelly Kreiczer-Lev, Intergenerational Relations and the Family Home, 8 LAW & ETICS
HUM. RTS. 131 (2014). For Canada, see generally Barbara A. Mitchell, Andrew V. Wister & Ellen M.
Gee, "There's No Place like Home" An Analysis of Young Adults'Mature Coresidency in Canada, 54
INT'LJ. AGING &HUM. DEV. 57, 57-58 (2002).
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they therefore need their parents' assistance."s As the recession deepens,
homeowners in their thirties and forties are sometimes forced to move back in with
their parents due to foreclosure. 8' Elderly parents living with their children is
another increasing phenomenon. There are the so-called "feminist grandmothers"
who are moving in to care for their grandchildren and to aid working parents.1 82 As
Jessica Dixon Weaver explains, "The reintegration of elders into the nuclear family
appears to be both a necessary and welcome change."'83 In addition, there are also
parents who need care and assistance in their old age and end up sharing a home
with their adult children. 8 4 This co-residence pattern is more common among
racial and ethnic minority groups.
18 5
Another telling example of cohabitation divorced from the sexual family is
siblings and kin groups who seek legal recognition as family members for social
welfare benefits provided by the state. The famous case of the Burden sisters was
brought before the European Court of Human Rights.ss The case dealt with two
elderly sisters who had lived together from birth. 7 They co-owned a house and
two other properties and "had chosen to live together in a loving, committed and
stable relationship for scvcral dccadcs, sharing their only home, to the exclusion of
other partners."' Each sister had willed her property to the other, and both sought
to avoid the considerable inheritance tax they would be expected to pay' 9 While
spouses and civil partners in the United Kingdom could leave their property to each
other and be exempted from the tax, the exemption was not available for other
individuals who lived together in a committed long-term relationship.' 9° The sisters
turned to the European Court of Human Rights, but were ultimately denied
relief' 91
A similar Israeli case is currently drawing media attention. Two sisters, aged
eighty-eight and ninety-three, who have lived together their entire life, are asking
"o See Hillary B. Farber, A Parent's "Apparent" Authority. Why Intergenerational Coresidence
Requires a Reassessment of Parental Consent to Search Adult Children's Bedrooms, 21 CORNELL J.L.
&PUB. POLY 39, 68-69 (2011).
1 Id. at 69.
182 Penelope Green, Your Mother Is Moving In? That's Great, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/garden/15mothers.htmd (quoting Dr. Ellen Pulleyblank Coffey).
183 Jessica Dixon Weaver, Grandma in the White House: Legl Support for Intergenerational
Caregiving, 43 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 4 (2013).
18 See Namkee G. Choi, Coresidence Between Unmarried Aging Parents and Their Adult
Children: Who Moved in with Whom and Why?, 25 RES. ON AGING 384, 384 (2003).
"' See Jennifer E. Glick & Jennifer Van Hook, Parents' Coresidence With Adult Children: Can
Immigration Explain Racial and Ethnic Variation?, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 240, 240 (2002).
" Burden v. U.K., 2008-111 Eur. Ct. H.R 49 (2008).
'83 Id. 1 10.
18 Id. 11, 53.
'8 See id. 11-12.




to be recognized as legal cohabitants.'92 They claim to be entitled to a survivor
pension plan from the institution of social security after one of them passes away,
much like spouses and sexual cohabitants in Israel.'93 The case has yet to be
decided, but it seems that they are facing an uphill battle that is unlikely to succeed,
as Israeli law currently only recognizes sexual cohabitants.
9 4
It is hardly a surprise that these two examples of cohabiting siblings concerned
elderly sisters, as they both deal with issues of vulnerability in old age. As Rosemary
Auchmuty points out in her analysis of the Burden case, "single women and old
people al~o have a long history of being overlooked and disregarded in the handing
out of privileges."' 95 These examples demonstrate that conceptualizing cohabitation
as a proxy for spousal relations misses the richness and complexity of this social
institution and its potential to challenge traditional familial norms. Legal
recognition of a broader concept of cohabitation can be used to effectively protect
the vulnerability of older individuals and to foster the freedom of association of
adults and the variety of family forms. A broader concept of cohabitation reflects
the interdependent and stable home lives that many cohabitants experience.
In considering the normative consequences of cohabitation, one must first
define the scope of the exploration. Not all forms of living arrangements can be
termed cohabitation. Some living arrangements are short-term and casual, with
limited shared space and few social interactions. For purposes of this article and the
legal reforms we propose, we define with particular contours the term
"cohabitation" or "cohabitants." In order for co-residents to be considered
cohabitants, the), must meet two prerequisites. First, the parties need to think of
the arrangement as long-term and semi-permanent.'96 Even if they do not actually
live together for a long period of time, the original expectations and overall
intentions of the parties are important. The longevity of the arrangement is
significant because it affects the willingness of the parties to invest in the home in a
variety of ways, including emotional investment, sacrifices, and contributions to the
household.'97 Second, when parties live together, the arrangement must include
some form ofjoint living. That is, the parties can neither live in completely separate
spaces nor have very little contact."' They cannot be strangers who simply live
192 Or Kashti, Elderly Sisters Fight to Be Legally Recognized as a 'Couple", HAARETZ ISRAELI
NEWS SOURCE (July 3, 2015, 1:09 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.664250.
193 See id.
194 See id.
19' Rosemary Auchmuty, Beyond Couples, 17 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 205,216 (2009).
196 For an example of the importance of longevity in zoning cases, see generally Borough of
Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888 (NJ. 1990). Cynthia Bowman takes up a related suggestion
regarding cohabitating couples, arguing that unmarried couples should be awarded the same benefits as
married couple, provided the), lived together for more than two years and had a child together. See
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
197 Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 8, at 144.
198 See id. at 143-44. Cf Iglesias, supra note 156, at 113 (arguing that not all types of shared
physical spaces implicate intimate association).
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under the same roof Cohabitation is about interaction and sharing a home.
Examples of joint living can include common activities, joint decision-making,
shared expenses, and agreed-upon rules of conduct.'99 With this definition in mind,
in the next Part, we consider the socio-legal attributes of sharing a home.
B. Social Science Explanation of the Substantive Importance of Cohabitation
In this section we describe in more detail the effects of home sharing and the
way the home creates joint lives that advance the goals of family law in a liberal
polity.
There is an array of interdisciplinary scholarship that focuses on the home. The
research suggests that there are two main definitional approaches to the meaning of
the home: home as a place of individual control and privacy, and home as a locus
where one experiences social relations.2 00 These two core meanings have been
studied in a variety of disciplines, including phenomenology, psychology, sociology,
and environmental studies.
20 1
The individual meaning of the home revolves around such a home creating a
sense of identity, belonging, permanence, and continuity.20 2 The home is a place
that allows the occupier to create a personal environment that reflects her everyday
needs and her individual taste. 2 3 It gives the individual spatial orientation; it allows
comfort in locating oneself. ° The home is potentially a haven; it is a place where
one begins her journey, and it is a place to come back to. In addition, the home is
probably the most significant site for privacy and autonomy in modern culture as
well as legal reality.205 The law celebrates this individual vision of home. °" Legal
rules protect possession in the home on the one hand, and privacy and freedom
from intrusion on the other hand.0 7 The home is a protected space where one is
free to defend oneself from intrusion, even with the use of deadly force. 20 ' This
199 See Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 8 at 138-39, 141-43.
2' See, e.g., Loma Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?, 29
J.L. &SOC'y 580, 588 n.28 (2002).
201 See id. at 588.
252 See Judith Sixsmith, The Meaning of Home: An Exploratory Study of Environmental
Experience, 6 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 281, 282, 287 (1986).
203 See Fox, supra note 198, at 599.
20' See id. at 593.
' See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 269-70,
272 (2006).
See id. at 269-70.
207 See id. at 256-57.
Almost all states have such laws. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-51.3 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 266 of the 2015 Reg. Sess. (excluding 240-241, 246, 258-264)) (stating that "a person is
justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat in any place he or she has the
lawful right to be"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.09 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 26 of the
131st General Assemb. (2015-2016)) (permitting residents to defend their homes using deadly force
without the requirement of retreating); Crawford v. State, 190 A.2d 538, 541 (Md. 1963) (citing
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legal focus on privacy or possession reflects an ethos of the home as a castle,2" a
sphere where one is left alone and is completely free from outside threats: the state,
creditors, or landlords.2"'
Yet, a home is not just about control and autonomy. Relationships within the
home are equally central to the definition of a home. Lisa Austin suggests that
home is important for individual identity because it is a location that hosts
important social relations.2"' The home enabls interactions with others, either as
guests and neighbors or the people with whom one lives.212 Communication with
others is a central characteristic of the home.213 When asked to provide reasons why
certain dwelling places were considered home, many respondents in a study
performed by Sandy Smith pointed to their relationships inside the home.214 A
related study by Judith Sixsmith found that the type and quality of relationships
and the emotional environment they afforded were significant aspects of the social
dimension of home.215 In fact, some respondents explained that the home would
not be a home without their family.216 Sixsmith has developed an account of
relationships in the home:
Thus, social networks built around a home and the relationships that create and
are created in a home are of utmost importance.... It is familiarity with other
people, their habits, emotions, actions etc., indeed the very knowledge that they
are there, which creates an atmosphere of social understanding whereby the
person[']s own opinions, actions and moods are accepted, if not always
welcomed.217
The interdisciplinary literature illustrates that living with people who are near
and dear to the heart is one of the qualitieG that make a house a home.218 Indced,
common law rule that use of deadly force is allowed in the case of home intrusion); Barton v. State, 420
A-2d 1009, 1010 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) ("[A man] is not bound to flee and become a fugitive from
his own home, for, if that were required, there would, theoretically, be no refuge for him anywhere in
the world.").
209 See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: How THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION
IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 2 (2009); see also Barros, supra note 203, at 257; Stephanie M. Stem,
Residential Protectionism and the Legal MythologA of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093,1105 (2009).
210 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 198, at 601 (acknowledging that home is thought of as a refuge from
outside threats).
211 Lisa M. Austin, Person, Place, or Thing? Property and the Structuring of Social Relations, 60 U.
TORONTO L.J. 445, 451 (2010).
212 See Sixsmith, supra note 200, at 281-82; Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qialities of a Home,
14 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL 31, 39 (1994); see also Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A Critical
Redew of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 62, 68 (2004).
213 See Smith, supra note 210, at 33, 43.
214 Id. at 37, 39.
215 See Sixsmith, supra note 200, at 291.
216 See id.
217 Id.
211 See, e.g., Austin, supra note 209, at 451; Mallett, supra note 210, at 83.
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most people live with others.219 Philosophers have similarly described the home as
essentially being with others.22 °
Yet, relationships in the home can also be offensive and intrusive. Some
feminist theorists critique legal emphasis on the home, arguing that the home can
act as a prison for women. 221 It is often defined as a feminine spatiality, where
women function as primary caretakers.222 The home thus subjects women to
traditional roles of tending to the needs of other members of the family.223
In addition, it has been argued that the home is a physical setting "through
which basic forms of social relations and social institutions are constituted and
reproduced."2 4 The association of home with the family confines human relations
to a structure that is easily located and understood. It allows society to control the
family, favor certain associations, and encourage certain patterns of behavior,
particularly those associated with the nuclear family.225 Indeed, the legal rules
reviewed above support the conclusion that legal regulation of the home provides a
channeling function in favor of preferred, nuclear, biological, and marital family
forms.
2 2 6
Moreover, the home embodies both the benefits and risks of privacy.227 Home
life can be a shelter from the public sphere, but it can also be dangerously protected
from public scrutiny, creating the setting for abuse of vulnerable parties, such as
women and children. 22' The extent to which the home has been and continues to
be potentially abusive cannot be ignored. Therefore, when discussing children in
particular, cohabitation alone, we argue, should not come with automatic rights,
but only a presumption for limited rights when coupled with sustained care.
Even when not amounting to physical abuse or consecrating traditionalist
family forms, cohabitation can mean intrusion, loss of privacy, and even
subordination. The dark side-or at least the non-intimate side-of cohabitation
must also be taken into account. For instance, sociological studies point to
219 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH
1 (2008) (noting that "[m]ost homes have more than one resident").
2 See Mallett, supra note 210, at 83.
fll See id. at 72.
See Loma Fox, Re-Possessing "Home" A Re-Analysis of Gender, Homeownership and Debtor
Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. &MARYJ. WOMEN &L. 423, 436-37 (2008).
z' See id. at 488.
14 Mallett, supra note 210, at 68 (quoting Peter Saunders & Peter Williams, The Constitution of
the Home: Towards a Research Agenda, 3 HOUSING STUD. 81, 82 (1988)).
" See Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 91 (noting that the law's encouragement of marriage
perpetuates traditional behaviors among individuals). See generallyEthan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009) (discussing the potential to consider friends as fiduciaries).
226 See supra INTRODUCTION.
" See generally Jeannie Suk, Is Pivacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485 (2009) (discussing the
problematic nature of privacy in the home).
2 Cf Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust. Reflections on tho ALTs Treatment of Do Faeto
Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 90, 106-17 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
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childrens' difficulties in handling rules forced on them by parents. 2 2 9 Children
often experience the loss of privacy and autonomy and an inability to influence
decision making in the home. 2 3  Parental rules regarding sexual relationships at
home, requirements concerning information on children's whereabouts, and control
of domestic spaces by parents are all indicative of loss of autonomy and• 1 1 231
independence. Living with others in these cases poses a threat to intimacy and
solidarity. In addition, in certain cases, people live together without enjoying
intimacy and interdependency. People sometimes live together simply because it is
convenient. Under the current reality of recession, and in light of economic
hardship, sharing a home clearly offers financial gain.
Both these potential benefits and risks should inform legal rules. From a legal
perspective, the social phenomenon of cohabitation holds certain advantages as a
foundation for familial rights and obligations. One of the biggest challenges of
family law is determining how to define the family in a way that truly allows for
freedom of association." 2 An inclusive, progressive definition of the family should
go beyond the sexual family.233 On the one hand, in creating a more inclusive
approach to family, the law thereby looks for ways to recognize intimacy in
informal relations and to provide rights and obligations to intimate associations
that are not formally recognized or supported under current legal rules. On the
other hand, it is extremely difficult to discern between different levels of intimacy
and commitment.
For example, Laura Rosenbury has argued for legal recognition of friends as
providing familial functions of care and support.234 Yet, arguably, there are all kinds
of friends. We have convenience friends, historical friends, crossroad friends, cross-
generational friends, and "friends who come when you call them at two in the
morning.""5 We share a certain level of intimacy with all of them, but the intensity
of the relationship and the degree of commitments vary greatly. Thus, Rosenbury's
insight about the nature of friendship and the intimacy involved is important.
However, capturing the right level of intimacy in granting legal recognition to
2 Naomi Rosh White, "Not Under My Roof." Young People's Experience ofHome, 34 YOUTH
& Soc'Y 214, 216-18 (2002).
230 See i d
21 See id. at 218-20. Cf Evie Kins et al., Patterns of Home Leaving and Subjective Well-Being in
Emerging Adulthood: The Role of Motivational Processes and Parental Autonomy Support, 45
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1416 (2009) (discussing implications of a study "for the meaning and
development of autonomy during emerging adulthood").
232 See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
2' See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
z See Rosenbury, supra note 12, at 202-19.
235 For several categories of friendship, see JUDITH VIORST, NECESSARY LOSSES: THE LOVES,
ILLUSIONS, DEPENDENCIES AND IMPOSSIBLE EXPECTATIONS THAT ALL OF US HAVE TO GIVE
UP IN ORDER TO GROW 170 (1986).
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friendship can be tricky. Recognizing friendship is likely to be difficult to discern
and potentially under- and over-inclusive.
It is against this background that cohabitation can, at least potentially, open up
new possibilities for capturing different forms of intimacy. Cohabitation can serve
as a good proxy for close, intimate relationships for three central reasons. First,
many people live together because they enjoy each other's company, trust one
another, and want to share their lives. Cohabitation demonstrates intimacy because
when living together is long-term and characterized by joint living, it signals
attachment between the parties involved.236 While "intimacy" is often taken to
mean "privacy," it also means commitment to ongoing, shared experiences that
include caring about the other and investing in a relationship 37
Second, sharing a home itself creates intimacy between the cohabitants
involved. Long-term relationships in the home tend to be interdependent, both
economically and emotionally.23 Cohabitants rely on each other for the payment of
expenses or common necessities, and occasionally they even have intermingling
funds.239 In addition, they may engage in common activities, enjoy spending time
together, and rely on each other's care and support when necessary.2" Cohabitation
signals the intent to have such a relationship, and the act of cohabiting furthers the
nature of the intimate relations by creating sharing and interdependency over time.
Third, cohabitation adds a level of stability to a relationship. Cohabitants share
a physical setting that is also perceived as one's most private and intimate
spatiality.24' Living together instills stability and constancy because the parties are
grounded in the same location, a location that is often associated with roots and
permanence.242 Home invests a person's life with stability and is a condition for
' Consider with the cohabitation of couples. One study found that, "[w]hile cohabitation did not
appear to be related to couple permanence, it was associated with measures of couple intimacy." Barbara
J. Risman et al., Living Together in College: Implications for Courtship, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 77,
80 (1981); see also Em Griffim & Glenn G. Sparks, Friends Forever: A Longitudinal Exploration of
Intimacy in Same-Sex Friends and Platonic Pairs, 7 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 29 (1990)
(analyzing data of longitudinal study related to identifying variables predictive of doseness among pairs
of friends).
" See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 33-34
(1976).
' Cf Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005) (discussing
property's role in creating communities).
239 Iegl rules can distinguish between fqmilill and non-familii! relationship_ in the home bvafc
on, among other things, emotional and financial interdependency. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543
N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989), see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 9 § 2204.6(d) (West,
Westlaw through amendments included in the New York State Register, Vol. XXXVII, Issue 51, dated
Dec. 23, 2015); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 6.04.
0 See, e.g., Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888, 894 (NJ. 1990).
241 See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
242 See Vallorosi, 568 A.2d at 891, 894-95.
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physical safety.243 Cohabitants are thus physically connected, and they are bound to
interact with one another on an ongoing long-term and semi-permanent basis.
Relationships in the home encapsulate a promise and a risk- The promise is an
opportunity to recognize the intimacy created when people live together as its own
foundation for familial rights and obligations, in a way that frees us from
traditional boundaries. At the same time, cohabitation poses the risk of creating an
illusion of an open definition, when, in actuality, it only replicates the same
traditional, structure or, even worse, creates realms of privacy that hide abusive
behaviors. Both the benefits and dangers must be kept in mind.
Overall, we believe that recognizing cohabitation as a legal category makes
sense because of the important elements of intimate association that it captures:
commitment to an ongoing relationship, interdependence, and stability. Home
sharing often leads to mutual care and nurture, as well as interdependence,
attachment, and stability, which are fundamental aspects of the kind of familial
relationships that family law intends to support in order to advance all people's
well-being. Thus, in expanding our notions of family and in exploring a more
progressive vision of the family form, cohabitation provides an important focal
point. Thus, it should be part of the vision for expanding the family form.
However, the conformist, conservative, and potentially dangerous potential of
providing legal significance to cohabitation should also be kept in mind in crafting
appropriate riles. For instance, cohabitation as a requirement for family can do
more harm than good in expanding family forms. Intimacy in family life and strong
relationships that need to be recognized can exist without cohabitation. And,
imposing familial obligations on cohabitants in too broad a manner may not
capture the nature of joint living and may trap people in relationships they did not
intend. Moreover, when discussing children in particular, cohabitation alone
should not come with automatic rights. Rather, cohabitation should only create a
presumption of limited rights when coupled with sustained and significant levels of
caregiving demonstrated by the cohabiting functional parent.2" Children's interests
and the dangers of cohabitation need to be considered, as well as the benefits and
intimate relationships cohabitation creates. Thus, we attempt to craft a nuanced
approach to the legal significance of cohabitation that captures the nature of the
intimacy, commitment, dependability, and interdependence involved, but does not
go too far in trapping people in their domestic lives or in assuming that only
cohabitation is relevant in creating familial life.
In the next part, we will set out our vision for a consistent and meaningful legal
recognition of cohabitation decoupled from sex that takes into account the risks
and benefits of such recognition of cohabitation.
243 See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829 (2009) (citing KARL
PoLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 178 (1944)).
244 See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 421-23; ALT PRINCIPLES, supra note 10,
§ 2.03 cmt. b(iii).
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I1. COHABITATION AND FAMILY FORMATION: CARING, SHARING, AND
FORMAL REGISTRATION
Theoretically, it is possible to imbue cohabitation with a range of legal
significance in the law of family formation-from little or no legal relevance or, at
the other extreme, as the primary legal factor in recognizing the legal family. In
between these extreme positions are many shades of gray and the potential to
recognize cohabitation in some contexts and not in others. We believe that given
the centrality and importance of the home in people's lives described above,
cohabitation should be a separate category with some potential for legal
significance. Moreover, we believe in the importance of recognizing the legal status
of cohabitants in a consistent manner, with different applications and levels of
recognition justified and explained. However, the risks and dangers of focusing on
cohabitation in family formation must also be kept in mind, and cohabitation
should not have a coercive or confining impact. The normative account of
cohabitation we describe aims to be progressive and to heed the risks of the
historically conservative use of cohabitation. It looks to expand the definition of
family using the legal category of cohabitation in a fluid and fleible manner that is
less based on the rigidity of sexual and genetic relations, but not in an exclusive or
coercive manner that tends to limit choice and intimacy instead of increasing
flexibility.
In order to comport with the normative framework outlined above, the legal
significance of cohabitation should be applied carefully in different contexts. In
order to account for both the risks and benefits of cohabitation, a normative
account has to consider the relevance of cohabitation together with other factors-
namely, caring, sharing, and registration-to justify imposition of rights and
obligations in certain contexts and prefer autonomy in others. We provide three
examples of how we believe the legal category of cohabitation should affect legal
rights and obligations. We argue that it is appropriate to impose property
distribution obligations upon cohabitants only when there is economic sharing in
addition to cohabitation. Moreover, cohabitation should be relevant in providing
presumptive rights to visit with children, but only if significant caregiving is also
involved. Finally, cohabitation alone should create legal rights and obligations only
if the cohabitants register their status so as to capture their intent and commitment
to the cohabitating relationship.
Cohabitation plays a different role in each of these examples. In the context of
caring for children, cohabitating with children for whom one is caring
demonstrates evidence of a deep and encompassing caregiving relationship that
may be indicative of functional parenthood deserving of legal status.245 However,
245 See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 421-23.
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cohabitation should not be a requirement for being awarded visitation or custodial
rights depending on the context because requiring cohabitation can have a
conservative effect on family formation and may not reflect the variety of
relationships formed. Moreover, custody decisions need to focus on advancing
children's interests, and thus cohabitation alone should not automatically come
with visitation rights. Rather, cohabitation should create a rebuttable presumption
of visitation when cohabitation is coupled with meeting minimum caregiving
requirements.
With regard to property distribution, the economic sharing often involved in
cohabitation can justify imposing an equitable division of property upon
termination of the cohabitant relationships. 2" And, cohabitation is often a
necessary element for imposing such a regime on non-marital relationships because
it serves as the foundation for a shared household.247 Yet, the analysis does not
preclude economic sharing outside the home.248
Finally, cohabitation can stand on its own merits when parties formally agree to
the legal status, explicitly incurring state benefits and certain mutual obligations
upon themselves in a matter that is supported but not imposed by the state. Such a
registration system can increase autonomy and avoid imposing unwanted
obligations on those who choose to enjoy the benefits of cohabitation.
We believe that state recognition of cohabitation in this manner is important to
capture the intimate associations in new, more progressive forms of family life that
are crucial to people's lives. There are two main ways the state can support
cohabitants. One is to allow cohabitants to create formal legal relations between
themselves through registration systems like the French Pacte Civil de Solidarit
("PACs") and to recognize such intimate associations in granting state benefits.
This allows cohabitants to "opt-in" to family-related benefits. The other is to
impose or ascribe rights and obligations upon cohabitants due to the fact that they
cohabitate like the ALI Principles suggest is appropriate.
24 9
246 See, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 835-36 (Wash. 1995) (holding that cohabitants in
a meretricious marriage-like relationship are entitled to equitable distribution even if not married); see
also ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 6.03 Reporter's Notes cmt. b (referring to the well-established
case law in the state of Washington, as well as developments in Oregon, Mississippi, and Florida for
providing equitable distribution to cohabitants).
247 Connell, 898 P.2d at 835-36; ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 6.03 Reporter's Notes cmt. b.
24 See Halley, supra note 11, at 901 (focusing on the broader concept of economic household, not
necessarily including cohabitation, as the basis of family law) ("All household members may live in the
same residence, or they may not. What is crucial is that households pool income and labor resources in
that they allocate work responsibilities and income streams among household members for the purposes
of reproducing both existing and new humans, securing social security, and contextualizing and
distributing the costs and benefits of consumption."); Kelly, supra note 11, at 398 (focusing on economic
sharing without reference to cohabitation as a basis for property distribution).
249 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 9, § 6.03 Reporter's Notes cmt. b.
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Ascribing legal status that imposes rights and obligations is appropriate when
there are vulnerable parties who need the protection of the state.25 ° Alternately,
when the parties explicitly choose to create formal legal relations, imposition of
those autonomously chosen mutual obligations is appropriate. Cohabitation creates
vulnerability when the cohabitant relationships include caring or sharing. When
the intimate association involved in cohabitating results in caregiving for children
or dependent elders, with regard to which there is no formal legal connection, such
care can create deep, intimate relationships between the dependent and the
caregiver and economic vulnerability, since such care is often unpaid and, in order
to care, caregivers are likely to compromise their availability for paid market
work.25' And, the emotional bonds result in vulnerability because the relationship
can be terminated at the whim of a formal legal parent or guardian.
When cohabitation leads to economic sharing and commingling, this also
creates vulnerability to non-married persons, as property belongs to tide-holders
and owners in a manner that does not take into account such sharing. Cohabitants
can be evicted at will and receive no compensation for their longtime sharing.
Therefore, cohabitation combined with caring and/or sharing creates a strong
reason for the state to step in and protect cohabitants. But, when there is not caring
or sharing, there is less vulnerability, and there should be greater reliance on the
will of the parties. In such cases, it is up to the state to provide recognition of these
alternative family forms if the parties intend to create them, but imposition is less
justifiable. In fact, imposition can trap people in relationships they do not want or
intend and can act as a conservative force in tying people who live together into
mandatory, marriage-like relations.
252
In the following Parts we will give examples for how we believe the legal
category of cohabitation should be applied. We develop three categories and
consider the legal implications of cohabitation in each category. We conclude that
when cohabitation is combined with caring or sharing, rights and obligations may
be imposed due to the potential vulnerability involved. When cohabitation stands
' See generally Martha Albertson Fmeman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in
Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW
AND POLITICS 13 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Great eds., 2013); Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1 (2008); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13
NEV. L.J. 619, 619-20 (2013) (describing the vulnerability of the human condition and the subsequent
need for state protection due to that vulnerability).
25 See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 101-13 (2000); Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism:
Reconstructing the Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 170-71
(1998); Laura T, Kessler, The Attachment Cap; Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371,
386-87 (2001) (describing women's disproportionate caregiving responsibilities and their detrimental
effects on women's participation in market work).
2 See Lifshitz, supra note 50, at 1571-72.
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by itself, registration of status should be provided for and accepted by the state, and
default rules for such registration should be created.
A. Cohabitant Caregivers: Caring for Dependents in the Home
Caring for dependents in the home is a modem reality as well as an ancient
tradition. Although alternatives such as nursing home care for the elderly or
boarding school for older children exist, home care for dependents is still a
fundamental part of the lives of most people. At any given time, many families are
caring in their home for dependent children, and not infrequently for elderly and
infirm relatives as well. This is a social phenomenon that has always been relevant
for many households, though it does not match the ideal nuclear family.
Providing care to children and other dependents creates a derivative
dependency or vulnerability.253  Home care for family members and other
cohabitants is usually not paid, and time spent caring compromises market work,
therefore increasing economic vulnerability. 54 Moreover, caring stems from and
furthers deep emotional bonds and attachments that affect both the cared for and
the caregiver.255 Cohabitation strengthens the constancy of and dependency on
care, as the home is normally the site of the care provided. Joint living engrains the
dependency within the caregivers' own home life, creating a joint household and a
communal caregiving relationship centered on the mutual home. And, the joint
nature of the home makes ending such care not just a termination of that
caregiving relationship, but also an end to the joint home that has served as the
center of both the caregiver's and dependent's lives.
When care is provided within the sexual family to children or between spouses,
the law has developed equitable means to contend with such economic and
emotional vulnerability. Caregiving is a factor in property distribution and custody
determinations when marital relationships end that explicitly take into account
" See supra notes 248-249 and accompanying text
14 See supra notes 248-249 and accompanying text.2
55 SeeJOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9-28 (1973);
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 39-57 (1979); JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 54-59 (1986); In re Marriage of
Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478-81 (Cal 1996) ("IT]he paramount need for continuity and stability in
custody arrangements-and the harm that may result from disruption of established patterns of care and
emotional bonds with the primary caretaker-weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody
arrangements.") (emphasis added).
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these vulnerabilities.25 6 Children's needs are the focus of custody and child support
determinations under the best interests standard.
2 1
7
But, when care is provided by those who do not have legal ties to the children
involved, the care creates vulnerabilities to which the law gives no relief
Agreements might be made and payment provided, but this is rare. Cohabitants, in
particular, live together and share a home where caring for dependents is
something that is naturally shared. Moreover, when children and even elderly
relations are involved, sharing care work among those living in a joint household
becomes part of the overall family life and not something that is contracted or paid
for due to general distaste for commodifying intimate relations. 25" Thus, these
cohabitant caregivers and the economic and emotional vulnerability that develops
due to caregiving are left completely to the good will of those with legal ties to
children, a fact that can often be harmful to children and to those upon whom they
depend for care.
259
Take, for example, the facts of the New York case In re E.S. v. P.D.26' The case
dealt with a custody dispute over a nine-year-old child.26' The mother and father of
the child were married, and the mother was diagnosed with cancer when the child
was three years old.262 At that time, the mother's mother was asked to move in with
the family to help raise the child and to take care of the mother.263 The child's
grandmother did so and cared for the mother and the child until the mother's death
about nine months later, then stayed in the home to care for the child for three and
a half more years.26 4 The grandmother was undoubtedly part of the home and was
a cohabitant in accordance with our definition above, having no particular plans to
leave the home and living in a joint manner with the child and the father. In
addition, the grandmother cared for the child in an intimate and ongoing manner.
The court describes the caregiving as follows:
256 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307(a) (NATL CONFERENCE OF COMMRS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1970) (listing other factors, including contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the
marital property and contribution of a spouse as homemaker); see also Solomon v. Solomon, 857 A.2d
1109, 1115-16 (Md. 2004) (discussing whether "tax liabilities should . . . be taken into account in
valuing property for a marital award").257 See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307(b).
2"5 See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 107, at 90-93. Even if caregiving is paid, that should not
disqualify caregiving figures, whether cohabitant or not, from obtaining de facto parental status and
commensurate custodial rights depending on the situation. Id. at 94-97.
" See generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Case Against Separating the Care from the Caregiver:
Reuniting Caregivers' Rights and Children's Rights, 15 NEV. LJ. 236 (2014) (discussing the pitting of
children's rights and caregivers' rights).
26 In re E.S. v. P.D., 863 N.E.2d 100 (N.Y. 2007).
2" Id. at 102.
262 Id. at 101-02.




[The] grandmother comforted, supported and cared for the motherless child- She
got him ready for school, put him to bed, read with him, helped him with his
homework, cooked his meals, laundered his clothes and drove him to school and
to doctor's appointments and various activities, including gym class, karate class,
bowling, soccer, Little League baseball and swimming class.Y
Moreover, for three years, the father, grandmother, and child spent summers
cohabiting in the grandmother's summer house, maintaining the family structure
that they had created, even during vacations. 2 66  But, eventually power struggles
arose, mainly about how to raise the child (under a strict standard versus a more
lenient one), and the father asked the grandmother to move out and refused to let
her visit with his then-eight-year-old son.26 7 After two months of no contact
despite the grandmother's requests, the father allowed some phone calls and highly
supervised visitation, the conditions of which led the grandmother to seek judicial
recourse.2 6' The trial court granted the grandmother regular, unsupervised
visitation despite the strenuous objection of the father.2 69 The case went to the
highest court in New York, as the father challenged the decision based on Troxel v.
Granvilles parental right's presumption.2 70 The court granted the grandmother
visitation based on a best interests analysis and a statute that provided for
grandparent visitation.
27 1
The decision dearly came out correctly from an emotional perspective, although
one could certainly argue that it does not sufficiently conform with the holding of
Troxel v. Granville.272 One way to rebut the presumption or special weight
announced in Troxel in favor of parent's rights would be to lean on the cohabitant
relationship. But in in re E.S. v. P.D., there was no particular focus on the
relevance of the cohabitant relationship between the grandmother, father, and son.
In that case, the cohabitation was central to the nature of the relationship between
the grandmother and child and factored into the best interests determination in
addition to the care provided, although the decision to grant visitation under the
grandparent visitation statute is anchored in the biological relationship between
the grandmother and the grandchild..3 Cohabitation could be given a more
central, anchoring, role in a custody determination. Cohabitation created a





26' See id at 103.
270 Id.
271 Id.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) ("[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or
her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning
the rearing of that parent's children.").
273 See in re E.S., 863 N.E.2d at 103, 106.
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whims of the father, as she had to vacate his house immediately while the child was
at a friend's house and without an opportunity to say goodbye." 4 This
grandmother's entire life, which was centered on the shared home established with
her former son-in-law and grandson, was uprooted because of a parenting dispute
with the child's father.
275
While we do not believe that cohabitation needs to be a requirement for
obtaining visitation rights or establishing functional parenthood, cohabitant status
is clearly relevant and, when combined with ongoing care, establishes a distinct
legal connection among parties. Therefore, "cohabitation plus care," as illustrated in
the case of in re E.S. v. P.D., should provide a rebuttable presumption of visitation
rights that would likely have avoided years of litigation in multiple courts.
Cohabitation plus care can streamline a determination of functional parenthood
and thereby accurately reflect the shared home that is often created in such
scenarios. Custodial rights should be imposed to protect the caregiver-child
relationship from termination at the whim of the legal parent.
Cohabitants without biological relations to a child and who provide ongoing
care to dependents should also have presumptive rights to visitation, and possibly
more than that, depending on the nature of the relationship between the children
and their formal parents. Most often, it is same-sex partners who are cohabitants
with their sexual partners and their partner's biological child who seek judicial
recourse for visitation once the sexual relationship ends.276 Often these cohabitants
have engaged in long-term parenting roles with the children.277 Unlike in
grandparent cases, in same-sex partner cases, cohabitation is often a relevant
criterion.278 However, when used, cohabitation is looked to as a requirement, as
opposed to a presumptive factor, in awarding visitation. 279 Requiring cohabitation
acts as a traditionalist tool, modeling the homosexual family on the ideal
heterosexual nuclear family. A number of cases in the same-sex parent context have
demonstrated how the requirement of cohabitation can be a traditionalist force.
2
90
27 See id. at 102.
z See id.
276 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 961 (RI. 2000).
"' For a discussion of cases in which long-term functional caregivers receive legal status regarding
children with whom they live, see Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 422 n.7, 441-46
(citing the landmark cases of Rubano, 759 A.2d 959; Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 552 N.W.2d 843 (S.D.
1996); Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 246 A.D.2d 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); In re Marriage of Sleeper,
929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A-2d 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).
27 See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 422 n.7, 441-46 (citing Rubano, 759
A.2d 959; Quinn, 552 N.W.2d 843; Jean Maby H., 246 A.D.2d 282; Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d
1028; Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278).
279 See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1253 (Mass. 2004) (finding that lack of cohabitation, as well
as duration of relationship, precluded finding of parenthood); V.C. v. MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J.
2000) (listing cohabitation with child as one of four required factors); A.F. v. D.L.P., 771 A.2d 692,
699-701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (denying visitation because of failure to cohabit with child).
' See T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1253-54; A.F., 771 A.2d at 699-700.
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Cohabitation need not be present in order to generate functional parenthood status
or rights to visitation."' But, making cohabitation a presumptive factor
acknowledges the ways that it produces intimacy and interdependency, and
expresses ongoing commitment, creating a home where caregiving is shared and
attachments are developed.
Even cohabitants without a sexual relationship with a legal parent or a
biological relationship to a child should have their cohabitant status considered in
determining whether they should be allowed visitation rights with a child once
cohabitation ends. The nature of the shared home is just as central to a family's life,
the caregiving relationships are just as important, the attachments and sacrifice are
just as pronounced, and the vulnerabilities produced by the prospect of ending the
relationship or from economic sacrifice for the sake of caregiving are just as
significant as when there is a sexual relationship between parents. Both the child
and the caregiver will suffer if these relationships are not recognized. And, again,
such legal relevance, if clear, can help avoid harmful litigation.
28 2
Visitation would reflect the nature of the relationship before the end of
cohabitation, andas long as a formal parent is still primarily responsible for the
child, custodial awards would be limited to visitation.283 Moreover, such judicial
intervention should occur only at the end of the cohabitant relationship, a time of
crisis for the child.2 4 These rights would not be waivable, transferable, or subject to
contract, as they should be focused on children and relationships, and not on adult
liberty rights. The primary fear of imposing such rights would be that it would
threaten the parental rights of the child's formal parent,2"' but for the sake of the
children and the caregivers involved, such concerns should be set aside.
Imagine two friends who cohabit and raise their kids together after they have
ended their relationships with the children's legal fathers, who are largely not
involved in the children's everyday lives. Imagine, also, that although each mother
is dearly the dominant parent for their own biological children, the friends share
' See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 458, 460-61.
See Richard Neely, Commentary, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the
Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POLY REV. 168, 175-76 (1984); Jon Elster, SolomonicJudgments:
Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44 (1987) ("[C]ustody litigation imposes
clear and immediate harm upon children."); Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best
Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 63 (1990-91) ("[C]hildren have an interest
in not being the subjects of long and bitter litigations to determine their custody. Many experts have
expressed the view that litigated custody disputes can have a negative effect on children, often resulting
in tension, uncertainty, and feelings of tom loyalties."); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall
Meet. The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 123-24
(1997).
2n See Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 10, at 475.
2" See id. at 471-72.
" See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-70 (2000); Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750
(Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding unconstitutional Delaware's statute that allowed more than two parents
based on functional caregiving because of the invasion of parental privacy involved).
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the duties of carpooling, cooking, bathing, and putting the children to sleep
depending on work schedules. Imagine one mother's relationship with the children
deepens further as her friend has work assignments that result in frequent travel,
creating increasing interdependency and emotional bonds between her and all of
the children. If one biological family moves out due to a change in circumstance, it
would be assumed that the cohabitant would be allowed to visit with the child
when she could. However, if that mother refuses the other woman visitation
because of hard feelings, this could devastate the children and caregiver, depending
on the length of the cohabitation. The longer the cohabitation, then, the more
intimacy, interdependency, and shared living that will result in high levels of
caregiving should be recognized. But the likelihood under current family law that
cohabitants could obtain visitation rights to each other's children, despite the
intimacy of care involved, is unlikely,2" although it has not been often tested.287
If these friends were sexual partners, whether same-sex or heterosexual,
obtaining such rights may be more possible, as states are starting to recognize the
possibility of visitation with non-biological caregivers in committed relationships
with biological parents. The ALI Principles seem to acknowledge the possibility
that non-sexual, non-biological caregivers may be entitled to visitation, but in
practice, such awards have remained within sexual families.288 But sex does not have
anything to do with a caregiving relationship. It is a proxy for a committed
relationship between adults, and perhaps for the intimacy of the home-but non-
sexual home sharing also is a good indicator of intimacy and commitment,289 and
thus sexuality should not be the only factor involved. Creating a cohabitant class
that has presumptive rights to such visitation, if intimate caregiving is also involved,
can open up legal rules to alternative family lifestyles in a progressive manner. And,
as long as cohabitation is not a requirement, considerations of cohabitation can
avoid providing rights only in a conformist, traditional manner.
To be clear, this rebuttable presumption must also take into account the risks of
cohabitation-the risks that result from abuse and power struggles within the
private sphere of the home. Therefore, the presumption toward visitation should
only be applied when there is also a demonstration of significant functional care
provided, which would have to be shown by the cohabitant caregiver seeking
6 See, e.g., Scott v. Superior Court of Sacramento Cty., 171 Cal. App. 4th 540, 544-46 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) (refusing former cohabitant who provided significant care to father's children standing to
seek visitation with child); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(refusing to decide issue of whether a non-cohabitant friend of mother could be appointed as de facto
parent to preserve future visitation rights despite the intent of friends to raise children together).
" The rarity of non-sexual cohabitants asserting visitation rights of children reflects the traditional
notions of who is entitled to such rights, which are usually associated with the sexual family. If the law
took a more progressive approach, family structures could be channeled differently and people could be
more willing to assert legal rights.
2" See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 2.03(1).
" See supra Part lI.B.
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visitation. And, if there is evidence of abuse or neglect by such a caregiver, it is clear
that such a presumption would be overcome. If, as Robin Wilson argues,
cohabitant boyfriends have high rates of abuse,2 then any evidence of such abuse
should be used to eliminate a claim for visitation. Custodial decisions must always
be made with children's interests at the forefront. However, such concerns should
not be used to totally ignore the importance of cohabitation either.
B. Commingling Property. Shared Economic Households
Cohabitation contributes to a sense of physical safety and stability, and it
creates intimacy and interdependency. When cohabitation is coupled with
comingling of property, income, or labor, it becomes the foundation for a shared
household: a single economic unit. Because of the communal nature of this type of
cohabitation, parties are potentially vulnerable if and when the cohabitant
relationship ends. When a cohabitant is both the formal titleholder of the home
and the principal economic provider, non-owner cohabitants will most often have
no legal protection and will have the most to lose if the cohabitant relationship
comes to an end. Unless cohabitants are married, non-owners will receive no
proprietary or contractual interest in the home and will be forced to move out.
Their contribution to the household and to the communal efforts of the shared
lives will not be recognized.
When married couples pool labor and income, the law acknowledges their
sharing by awarding equitable distribution of assets accumulated during the
marriage.29' Either through equitable distribution or community property rules, the
law recognizes the economic functioning of the family in a way that extends beyond
calculating financial contributions, incorporating in-kind labor and caregiving
functions as well 292 Property distribution rules value nonmarket contributions to
the shared marital household,293 and the ALI Principles, although not binding,
20 See Wilson, supra note 226, at 106-16.
291 See JAY E. FISHMAN ET AL. , STANDARDS OF VALUE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 168-77
(2007); LYNN D. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FAMILY LAW IN THE USA 247-48 (2011).
' See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American
Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 397 (1993); Shari Motto, Labor, Luck, and Love:
Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate Property, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2008) ("The most
prevalent justification for the rule classifying spouses' earnings as marital is known variously as the
partnership theory of marriage, the contribution theory, the joint property theory, or the marital-sharing
theory.") (internal citations omitted); Helene S. Shapo, "A Tale of Two Systems"- Anglo-American
Problems in the Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 707, 722 (1993);
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 43-46 (1994).
93 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 934 (Miss. 1994) (discussing the relevance of
indiroct domestic services contributing to earned income as relevant for equitable diatribution); UNlF.
MARRIAGE &DIVORCE ACT § 307 94 U.L.A. 288 (1998). See also HANOCH DAGAN,
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 115
(2013) ("[W]e can now hardly think of marital property law without equal division, which is probably
the feature least contested by courts, commentators and lay people alike .... Equal division, is this view,
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support going further and recognizing emotional stability, optimism, and social
skills.294 Legal rules compensating non-market work at the dissolution of marriage
are based alternately on partnership theory,295 the idea of marriage as an egalitarian
liberal community,2%  or as a way to compensate in-kind and caregiving
contributions within a joint household that are otherwise not accounted for.197 Such
compensation is particularly compelling when the couple commits to a joint life
within a marriage.
Yet, while there are other forms of joint living beyond marriage, equitable
division rules currently apply only to married couples. Unmarried couples who
comingle property, contribute nonmarket goods, and share income are not entitled
to such rights and benefits. 98 Even when couples function as a single economic
unit, in most states in the United States, cohabitation of unmarried couples is not
reason enough to award one partner a share of the property accumulated during the
cohabitation period by the other partner. 99 Even after the Marvin ruling, proving
implied agreements of economic sharing is difficult and often unsuccessful."°
Indeed, there have been calls for reform that argue for extending similar rights to
unmarried cohabitants.3 ' Yet, even these suggestions are narrow in their scope and
apply only to marriage-like, sexual relationships.
Alicia Kelly offers a more comprehensive view of economic sharing in
families. 0 2 She supports the recognition of sharing not only in intimate
partnerships, but also within intergenerational families.03° Kelly's focus is on the
need for equitable distribution based on sharing behaviors generally, whether
economic or through caregiving, and not on the particular intimacy or
interdependency created by cohabitation and the vulnerability it creates.30 4 We
believe that cohabitation, particularly when combined with economic sharing,
creates the need for recognition due to the distinct benefits of intimacy and stability
as well as the particular vulnerability it creates. Furthermore, the focus on
cohabitation allows for a wider vision of the family than Kelly acknowledges,
because it goes beyond biological and sexual ties that are still the focus of Kelly's
expanded vision of the family unit.3"5 The legal category of cohabitation proposed
simply reflects an accurate valuation of both spouses' contribution, taking into account nonmarket work
and interpersonal support.").
2 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 4.09 cmt. c.
2 See Motro, supra note 290, at 1631-36.
Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties ofMariage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 103-06
(2004).
297 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 10, § 4.09 cmt. c.
See supra note 58-62 and accompanying text.
9 See Berenson, supra note 49, at 297.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
301 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 56, at 3-5.
3 See generally Alicia B. Kelly, Sharing Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REv. 967 (2013).
o See id. at 967-68, 981-82.




in this article would additionally acknowledge nonrelatives who function as a single
economic unit. We look to anchor such unity and joint living in the home because
this relationship naturally generates a shared living experience that goes beyond
sexuality and biology.
The facts of Frambach v. Dunihue provide an excellent example of how joint
living solidifies and entrenches the need to compensate economic sharing.3" Mr.
Dunihue was a widower with seven children.3"7 The Frambachs were a married a
couple who lived nearby, raising their four children. 3" On one occasion, the
Frambachs and the Dunihues waited out a hurricane together in the Frambachs'
home.3 9 This arrangement proved to be so pleasant and agreeable that the two
families decided to make it permanent.31 The three adults and their twelve
children lived together in the Frambachs' home for nineteen years.3 1 ' During that
period, Mr. Dunihue made a number of physical improvements to the house,
which was previously not suited for so many occupants, as it was small and had no
indoor plumbing. 312 Although each of the men had a separate bank account, Mrs.
Frambach had access to both accounts and decided which account would be used to
pay a particular bill.313 The three adults also shopped together for clothes, furniture,
and automobiles. 314 They therefore comingled income and labor, and each of these
adults contributed to the household physically and financially. 1 This idyllic
environment lasted for almost two decades until it ended abruptly.316 One day,
Mrs. Frambach called Mr. Dunihue at work and told him he had thirty minutes to
move out.
317
Likely because Mr. Dunihue had no available remedy based on cohabitation
and economic sharing, he had to resort to contractual arguments. He "claimed that
the Frambachs had promised him a place to live for the rest of his life in exchange
for his work,"318 and he requested that an equitable lien be imposed on the
property.319 The trial court concluded that they were all a single family-unit and
that the fair result would be to make them tenants in common "right down the
middle."3" The appellate court reversed the decision.32" ' The court felt compelled to
See Frambach v. Dunihue, 419 So. 2d 1115, 1116-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).











318 Id. at 1116-17.
319 Id. at 1117.
320 Id.
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deny such equitable distribution because it found no evidence of a promise or an
agreement.12 2 Moreover, employing a narrow unjust enrichment perspective, the
court explained that the only relevant question was whether Dunihue's
"contributions exceed[ed] the value of the benefits received by him from the
Frambachs," and the court suspected the contributions would prove equal.3 23 Thus,
the unjust enrichment argument failed to provide Mr. Dunihue the relief he
requested and which seemed intuitively fair to the trial court.3 2' The nature of the
joint household itself was not sufficient cause for an equitable property distribution
absent a finding of contractual agreement.2 5
The appellate court in Frambach failed to acknowledge the value of
cohabitation coupled with economic sharing that created a single economic unit.
Just as in a joint economic household formalized by a marriage certificate, the
Frambachs and Dunihues had built a community in the home that cannot be fully
appreciated if we focus solely on an external valuation of contribution. The trial
court rightly acknowledged the shared household and each party's participation in a
common and familial enterprise. When cohabitation ended, Mr. Dunihue became
vulnerable, as he lost his home and the financial sharing that went with it. In this
case, the home was not only a physical haven, but it also a means of financial
stability, sociability, intimacy, and interdependency. Because Mr. Dunihue had no
formal property or contractual rights in the home, the law failed to recognize his
loss.
When cohabitation is coupled with economic sharing, a cohabitant with no
formal rights should be entitled to legal protection acknowledging her interest in
the home through rules of constructive trusts or equitable liens.326 Such legal
devices are particularly relevant in securing an equitable distribution for those who
live in a shared space. However, parties can decide to explicitly opt out of this rule.
Private contracting can be important, as it allows property owners to open up their
home to their extended family and friends and engage in economic sharing without
fearing legal remedies.327 Much like married couples can, within limits, enter a
prenuptial agreement to curtail default rules regarding equitable distribution, 328 so






31 See generally Henry Monaghan, Constructive Trust and Equitable Lien: Status of the Conscious
and the Innocent Wrongdoer in Equity, 38 U. DET. L.J. 10 (1960) (explaining constructive trusts and
equitable liens); Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U. CAL. DAVIS L.
REV. 1369, 1380-81 (2013) (explaining the rationale underlying informal sources of property rights).
3 Cf Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 8 (discussing the author's suggestions for remedies for the end of
familial sharing situations in the context of parent and adult-child relationships).
32" See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements
and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. &MARYL. REv. 145, 154 (1998).
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lien in most circumstances.329 Hesitant parties can therefore continue to live
together without necessarily making a legal commitment.
However, due to the potential vulnerability involved, when no explicit
agreement preceding the relationship exists, the constructive trust should be
imposed when cohabitation is combined with economic sharing. This default rule
is important for two reasons. First, when cohabitants function as a single economic
unit, the law should acknowledge the value of cohabitation. Default rules have a
powerful expressive function by communicating the values promoted by the law.33
Second, the rule imposes transaction costs on the party who does not share the
communal ideal of cohabitation and forces him to raise his objection and convince
non-owner cohabitants to contract for equitable distribution.33'
It is important to note that the suggested rule is not about economic sharing per
se. Our argument focuses on the unique nature of economic sharing in the home. It
builds on the physical safety, financial security, and interdependency of living with
others and then highlights the benefits and vulnerabilities that economic sharing
adds to cohabitation. That being said, the argument does not preclude other
judicial remedies that recognize sharing outside the home, as Alicia Kelly
suggests.
33 2
C. Registering the Cohabitant Family. Default Rules and the Need for State
Recognition
We now consider the legal consequences of cohabitation as it stands on its own
merits. Even when cohabitation is not coupled by caring and sharing, it has
considerable social benefits, as we argued in Part II. These social benefits are
important and deserve legal recognition when the parties explicitly choose to create
'- See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 590-91, 618, 622 (2013)
(discussing, in particular, Washington state's system of opting in to such legal benefits and obligations).
" For the expressive finction of the law, see generally Cass R_ Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUJM. L. REV. 903 (1996). For the power of default
rules, see generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 608 (1998); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998). Cf David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1815 (1991) (discussing the modem trend to interpret contracts based on what the parties would
have assented to had they explicitly discussed the issue); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of
Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (identifying
the problematic expressive function of laws disfavoring homosexual individuals and same-sex couples).
331 This concept bears resemblance to penalty rules in contract law. Such rules are purposely set at
what the parties would not want, in order to encourage them to reveal information to each other. See
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 89-91 (1989).
" See generally Kelly, supra note 300.
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formal legal relations. As such, the state should provide legal registration systems
for cohabitants in order to support these beneficial relationships and the secure,
intimate home life that cohabitation provides.
Think, for example, on the famous sitcom "Will & Grace."333 William Truman
and Grace Adler have been best friends since their freshman year of college, and
they have lived together in a New York City apartment for years.3 3 4 As Will is gay,
the couple is not in an intimate conjugal relationship.335 These are two independent
unrelated adults who did not comingle their income or property, and neither of
them requires care. Nonetheless, their relationship is long standing, stable,
affectionate, and interdependent. In these circumstances, it does not seem
necessary to impose legal obligations on the parties, as there are no particular
vulnerabilities that need protection. At the same time, the state should support and
allow such cohabitants to protect their intimate relationship if they so choose,
because of the benefits and security it provides to them. The argument in favor of
legal recognition of cohabitation through state-supported systems of registration is
thus shaped by the values of autonomy and freedom of association.336 In addition,.,
the state should support intimacy that provides security and stability to individuals
living together in a shared home.
Suppose Will wants to make Grace his beneficiary for a health or life insurance
or a pension plan. Suppose he wants Grace to have hospital visitation rights or
medical decision-making power in case he becomes ill."' Perhaps Grace wants Will
to inherit her estate, even in the absence of a valid will, or to continue to live in her
rent control apartment after her death. To address these needs, we suggest a model
of registration. If cohabitants formally register their status so as to capture their
intent and commitment to the cohabitating relationship, their relationship should
create legal rights and obligations. The reason to address the needs of cohabitants is
both to respect their autonomy and for the state to support stable, interdependent
relationships that provide security and intimacy in the home to committed
cohabitants.
A ful-blown model of registration that includes a comprehensive survey of
rights and obligations exceeds the scope of this article. Instead, we offer several
guidelines for a registration scheme that correspond to the benefits of cohabitation,
including intimacy, stability, and interdependency, and that consider the values of
... See Evan Cooper, Decoding Will and Grace: Mass Audience Reception ofa Popular Network
Situation Comedy, 46 SOC. PERSP. 513, 517 (2003).
- See id at 516-17.
335 See id.
31 See supra notes 151-152. Cf Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law:
The Waning ofBelonging, 1991 BYU. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing autonomy and belonging in family
law).
337 Based on their circumstances, such an arrangement would potentially be allowed in Colorado.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-22-101 to -112 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. of
the 70th General Assemb. (2015)).
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autonomy, freedom of association, and a progressive vision of family formation.
Some of these guidelines are inspired by existing models and scholarly
suggestions.338 In particular, we compare our model to Registered Domestic
Partnerships in European countries and American states,339 the French Pacte Civil
de Solidarit6 (PACS),34 and other calls for reform.34'
First, registration provides an opt-in scheme that allows parties to pick and
choose their desired level of commitment. As Erez Aloni argues, an opt-in regime
respects the autonomy of the parties because it does not force duties based on the
living arrangement alone.342
Second, to be eligible for registration, parties must actually cohabit. A shared
residence may not be enough to secure eligibility for the benefits we discuss in the
following paragraphs, however, as not all living arrangements would be considered
cohabitation. As we indicated in Part II, cohabitation requires long-term
commitment and some form of joint living.343 These requirements are hard to
prove in advance, especially to an administrative authority such as the registrar.3"
Moreover, people may want to register in order to create a framework for their
relationship that is future-oriented. Therefore, people who intend to cohabit or
who already cohabit would be eligible to register as cohabitants and to receive state
benefits. However, if it later appears that registrants were not cohabitants, an
involved party or the state would be able to potentially cancel those benefits
through court action. Cohabitant benefits should only be cancelled in the case of
fraud or if the parties willingly and voluntarily decide not to cohabit but remain
registered, not upon an untimely death or other good faith reason when the
commitment to cohabit existed but perhaps ended sooner than intended.
Once a cohabitant relationship is established and then ends, any one of the
cohabitant parties should have the right and obligation to end the legal status by
contacting the state registration system. On the one hand, there is the value of
promoting autonomy for cohabitant couples. On the other hand, there is valid state
" See generally, e.g., Aloni, supra note 327 (proposing more options for legal recognition of
relationships); LAW COMMN OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALiY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 117-18 (2001) (discussing registration of relationships).
31 See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 336, at 117-18 (discussing developments in European
countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Spain, and in North American
countries, including Hawaii, U.S., and in Nova Scotia, Canada).
4 See generally Claude Martin & Irne Thry, The PACS and Marriage and Cohabitation in
France, 15 INTLJ.L. POL'Y & FAM. 135 (2001); Claudina Richards, The Legal Recognition of Same-
Sex Couples-The French Perspective, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 305 (2002).
341 See, e.g., LAW COMMN OF CAN., supra note 336, at 122 (Canadian proposal); see generally
Aloni, cupra note 327 (analy-ing registration of non marital relationohip3 achemc).
342 See Aloni, supra note 327, at 616.
3 See supra note 194-197 and accompanying text.
Registration schemes usually include formal requirements rather than discretionary authority.
See, e.g., LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 336, at 117-18 (analyzing current registration schemes);
Aloni, supra note 327, at 608-09 (discussing proposed registered contratual relationship scheme).
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policy in supporting relationships of those who actually cohabit. The state need not
be overly careful in determining who cohabits as long as there is autonomous
registration, but the state also has an interest in protecting itself from fraudulent
conduct and the provision of potentially expensive benefits, such that some
oversight may be necessary.
345
Third, unlike the prevailing view, we reject a firm limitation on the number of
parties to a registered union. Current schemes do not allow more than two
individuals to register as cohabitants.3 6 As long as individuals are indeed living in a
joint household, cohabitation can involve more than two individuals. However,
some limit seems reasonable, as decision-making and the provision of state benefits
could be overly complicated by too many cohabitants.347 Communes and
community living in apartment buildings with shared expenses are likely to
complicate interpersonal commitments. As in the case of fraud, discussed in the
previous paragraph, if relationships are abusive or exploitative due to fundamental
inequality, as many argue polygamous relationships may be by nature, state
oversight can be used to cancel benefits and registration on public policy grounds,
as multiple marriages are cancelled.
Furthermore, in accordance with our call to decouple sex and the home, we
support a scheme that allows unions between close relatives. This guideline differs
from the general assumption, as most schemes do not recognize such unions,
including those employed by France, Nova Scotia, and Nordic countries.348 Only a
minority of registered-partnership regimes allow dose relatives to register. In
Hawaii, under the "reciprocal beneficiaries" scheme, non-conjugal couples are
permitted to register their relationships. 49 In addition, Colorado's designated
beneficiary law provides that any two adults can register this way, no matter if they
are related or not.
350
These two requirements, limiting the number of individuals who can form a
union and denying registration to relatives, seek to mimic the conjugal relationship
based on an idea of monogamist couples. Together, these rules serve to exclude
various types of cohabitants, including multigenerational and intergenerational
families, siblings, and groups of roommates. Although cohabitation-based
s See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
"' See Richards, supra note 338, at 315; LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 336, at 117, 119-20.
However, the Canadian Law Commission suggested that in principle, there is no reason to limit
registration to two people. Id. at 118-19. Yet, the commission requires economic or emotional
dependence of some duration. Id. at 133 n.16.
" We leave the limit on the number of cohabitants to future considerations that take into account
the context and variety of benefits and obligations involved.
" See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 336, at 133 n.17.
141 IAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-2, C-4 (West, Westlaw through Act 243 [End] of the 2015
Reg. Sess.).
350 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-104 (1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.
of the 70th General Assemb. (2015)). However, the law requires that neither party is either married to
another person or is a designated beneficiary of another person. Id.
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registration may contribute to equalizing the status of same-sex couples, the
purpose of the reform is far more progressive and inclusive. Indeed, current regimes
both fail to address the full scope of cohabitation as a current social phenomenon
and do not meet their potential to promote a progressive vision of the family.
A fourth guideline refers to the exclusivity of registration. Suppose Will wants
to register his relationship with his good friend Jack. We suggest that if Will wants
to add Jack to an existing cohabitation union, with the agreement of other
cohabitants (namely Grace), such an addition should be approved, provided Jack
lives in the same home with Will and Grace. Cohabitation can indeed evolve to
include more individuals. This rule allows the family to develop over time and is
still founded on joint living. However, the model precludes individuals from having
separate registered unions at the same time. Will can only share a home with one
group, and he cannot be part of several homes at the same time. Will can choose to
end cohabitation with Grace and move in with Jack. To do that, the law should
allow an easy exit from an existing cohabitation union.351 However, Will can also
be married, and at the same time have a cohabitant relationship. This may affect
mutual rights and obligations, but it must be explored in context.
Fifth, registration should establish eligibility for benefits offered by various state
governmental entities, private companies, and organizations that are based on joint
living, in case the parties wish to receive them. Such benefits may include health
and life insurance plans,352 medical decision-making,
353 hospital visitation rights,354
and rent control protection.355 The Colorado scheme of "designated beneficiary"
351 C1 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 568
(2001) (discussing the importance of exit for autonomy).
3"I See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.58 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 807 of 2015 Reg.
Sess. & Ch. 1 of 2015-2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (requiring equal coverage under such benefits for registered
domestic partners and spouses); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 381.5, 10121.7 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 807
of 2015 Reg. Sess. & Ch. 1 of 2015-2016 2d Exec. Sess.)); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-102
(West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess. of the 70th General Assemb. (2015)).
13 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-102 (Westlaw); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 6-
203 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. General Assemb.) (allowing domestic partners to serve as
health care agents); NAT'L CTL FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS,
AND CIVIL UNIONS: SAME-SEX COUPLES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 1, 6-8, 22 (2015),
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Relationship-Recognition.pdf (noting those
states that have legally empowered domestic partners to make health care decisions). C£ Polikoff, supra
note 40, at 356 (supporting registration for non-conjugal couples, which would affect only medical
decision-making and inheritance rights).
114 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 15-22-102, 22-104 (Westlaw); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-
GEN. §§ 6-201 to -202 (Westlaw) (mandating hospital visitation rights to domestic partners). C£
Jessica R. Feinberg, The Survival ofNonmarital Relarionship Statuses in the Same-Sex Marriage Era: A
Proposal, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 45, 49 (2014) (noting that the history of the state's recognition of
nonmarital status began with ordinances requiring hospital visitation and insurance rights).
ss See 9 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (West, Westlaw through amendments through Mar.
1, 2015). The French PACS status provides "protection for residential leases when one member of the
PACS dies." Feinberg, supra note 352, at 55.
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law serves as the inspiration for this guideline.1 6 Cohabitants will file a state-
provided form, and by checking specific boxes on this form, cohabitants will be able
to decide which of the listed benefits they will commit to.357 However, the list of
available benefits on this form should be associated with joint living, which is the
basis for creating a cohabiting relationship."'
Sixth, registration may also influence the mutual rights and obligations between
the parties. Much like they can for third party benefits, cohabitants will be able to
check boxes in the provided form and decide whether or not they want to include
these mutual obligations in their union. Such rights may include property
distribution or support after separation. It is important to note that there is a
difference between parties who affirmatively choose to distribute property upon
separation and the protection of vulnerable parties in the case of economic sharing.
However, within one cohabitant group, if so chosen, state-provided and mutual
benefits must be equally provided to each cohabitant so as to regularize and not
overly complicate the relationship.
Another example of mutual rights is succession rights, and the applicability of
intestate succession rules, in case the deceased did not execute a valid will. The
subject of intestate succession is particularly important because a substantial
number of people die without executing a will.' There are numerous reasons for
not making a will, including premature death, poor access to resources, and fear of
confronting mortality. 3' 6 In addition, intestacy rules become important due to their
expressive function, 361 communicating a social message regarding who is considered
to be the family of the deceased.
3 62
356 See COLO REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-22-101 to -112 (Westlaw).
357 Id. §§ 15-22-104, -106.
358 Cf Aloni, supra note 327, at 610-11 (criticizing rights and benefits based on a status that is no
longer a proxy for economic dependence).
... Richard Eisenbreg, Americans' Ostrich Approach to Estate Planning, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2014
11:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2014/04/09/americans-ostrich-approach-to-
estate-planning/#475e782ff07b; see also THOMAS P. GALLANiS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 25 (5th ed. 2011) (stating the
conventional wisdom is that "[t]he older and wealthier you are, the more likely you are to have a will").
Yet, a study by Mary Fellows casts doubt on the notion that most people die intestate. Mary Louise
Fellows, et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in
the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 337-38 (1978) (reporting demographic
characteristcs of those who do and do not have wills); see also EUGENE F. SCOLES & EDWARD C.
HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 14 (5th ed.
1993).
3 See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1047-50 (2004).
" See, e.g., Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too
Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 199-200 (2006); Spitko, supra note 328, at
1103.
3 See Spitko, supra note 328, at 1100.
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Nancy Polikoff suggests a registration system with a predetermined bundle of
rights and obligations that includes intestate rights. 63 According to her suggestion,
if someone dies intestate-that is, without executing a valid will-the designated
person would receive the same share of the estate that the spouse would have
received. The problem with this rule is the diversity of cohabitants' relationships.
Some individuals might want to designate a smaller share of their estate to their
cohabitants than the share of a spouse, which is quite considerable. A different
possibility is to treat a registration form as a will substitute that allows the parties to
determine the specific share their cohabitant will receive.3"
To conclude, we offer a general framework for cohabitation-based registration,
guided by the values of autonomy and freedom of association. However, the
framework is not meant to serve as a comprehensive suggestion. Rather, the
purpose of these proposed guidelines is to demonstrate the plausibility of
cohabitation-based registration and to stress the progressive potential of
cohabitation as a foundation for the family.
CONCLUSION
Rights and obligations in family law have always been and remain centered
around the sexual family. However, focusing on sexuality and children born of
sexual reproduction as the center of family law is hard to justify in the face of other
compelling bases for intimate associations. Sexuality is used as a proxy for intimacy
and as a normative channeling function for family life, but other bases for intimacy
are just, if not more, relevant to people's lives. In particular, we argue that the
shared life of the home creates and entrenches joint familial life in a manner that
deserves legal recognition for the security and stability that cohabitation provides
and the intimacy it reflects.
The legal recognition for cohabitation we suggest should be completely
divorced from sexuality. When coupled with caring and sharing, rights and
obligations should be imposed on cohabitants. When based on voluntary, mutual
commitments without caring and sharing, the state should respect and support the
benefits of cohabitation by providing appropriate legal registration systems for
cohabitants. Moreover, the suggested framework is mindful of the potential
regressive effect of cohabitation, and it offers a nuanced approach that takes into
account the promise and the perils of the institution. Crafting legal doctrines
requires careful consideration of the legal context, as well as other relevant factors
and vulnerabilities involved.
See Polikoff, supra note 40, at 367-68.
4 On will substitutes, see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 7.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984); Grayson M.P. MeCouch, Wil
Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1123 (1993).
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Legal recognition of cohabitation does not cancel other forms of family
formation. Cohabitation can coexist and buttress other factors in creating familial
status, including more traditional markers, such as biology and marriage, and more
progressive principles based on functional care and economic households. However,
it is our argument that cohabitation itself is an important and meaningful factor for
family formation as the home is an essential ingredient in individual security,
stability, and social relations. The status of cohabitation, based on longevity and
joint action, deserves consistent and reasoned legal status in family law,
administrative law, and beyond.

